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Abstract 
This paper examines the impacts of bank owners and national bank regulation on the 
risk-taking of unlisted and listed banks in developing countries. National bank regulations 
reduce bank risk in 43 developing countries after controlling the shareholding level of large 
owners, other bank-level characteristics and country-level factors. Banks with large owners 
(governments, industrial companies, and foreigners) take less risk than other banks in 
developing countries when national regulation is considered. However, the marginal effect of 
regulation on bank risk varies with the identity of the large owner. National regulation and 
certain large bank owners (industrial companies and financial companies) have positive joint 
effects on bank risk. Regulations on capital adequacy, activity restriction, external auditing 
requirement, depositor protection scheme, and information disclosure are efficient in 
reducing bank risk. National bank regulations improve bank asset quality, boost liquidity and 
decrease bank sensitivity to market risk whilst they also increase management costs and 
hamper profitability of banks.  
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1.Introduction  
Prior studies by Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990) and Laeven and Levine (2009) 
show that bank risk varies positively with the presence and the shareholding of large owners. 
Agency theory suggests that ownership structure influences corporate risk-taking (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; John, Litov, and Yeung 2008). Shareholders with larger voting and cash flow 
rights have correspondingly greater power and incentives to shape corporate behaviour than 
smaller owners (Shleifer and Vishny 1986). From this perspective, ownership structure 
influences the ability of owners to alter bank risk in response to standard risk shifting 
incentives and to those created by official regulations (Boyd and Hakenes 2008). Saunders et 
al. (1990) find that banks controlled by large owners exhibit higher risk-taking behaviour 
than those controlled by managers with diverse ownership in the U.S. They do not, however, 
test whether ownership structure and regulation jointly shape bank risk-taking, or whether 
their results can be generalized beyond the U.S. to developing countries. Consistent with the 
theory that greater cash flow rights by a large owner are associated with more risk, Laeven 
and Levine (2009) also find that the risk is generally higher in publicly listed banks that have 
large owners with substantial cash flow rights than those with no large owner. They do not, 
however, differentiate the identity of the large owner or test whether their results can be 
generalized to unlisted banks. We contribute to this line of research by analysing a sample of 
unlisted and listed banks with different large owners in developing countries. 
Banks with different owners tend to have different risk-taking belabours. For 
example, European banks controlled by families or governments have lower profitability, 
higher earnings volatility and higher default risk than those controlled by financial 
institutions or industrial companies that benefit from diversification (Saghi-Zedek 2016). In 
developing countries with weak institutional quality, ownership concentrations by families or 
governments take place more frequently and are associated with higher agency costs than in 
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developed countries (Haw and Ho 2010). Government-owned banks, often reflect 
government-dictated policies in their lending decisions (Firth et al. 2009; Chen et al. 2013), 
tend to lend less prudentially than banks owned by other type of large owners (Jia 2009), and 
undertake more risk-taking behaviour than foreign banks (Zhu and Yang 2016). Foreign 
banks have grown significantly in developing countries in the past decade. The penetration of 
foreign banks improves the banking competition in the developing countries and the effect is 
stronger when the host country has a low banking concentration (Jeon et al. 2011). Whether 
the largest owner of a bank has a diversified portfolio affects the risk-taking behaviour of the 
bank (García-Kuhnert, Marchica and Mura 2017). These prior studies lead us to wonder 
whether bank risk is affected by the identity of large bank owners. Some owners, like 
financial companies, may have more diversified portfolios than others, like families. More 
importantly, different large bank owners may have distinct resilience or responses to 
regulations. Extant literature offers little empirical evidence on whether banks with different 
large owners take risk similarly under regulation, particularly in developing countries. 
Banking systems in developing countries are relatively underdeveloped and differ 
from those in developed countries.
1
 Most developing countries have reformed their banking 
systems since the 1990s’, through banking privatization, moving control of interest, opening 
market to foreign banks, etc. In addition to these reforms, banking systems of developing 
countries have also kept up with the development in global bank regulation. The global 
financial turmoil in 2008 exposed such problems in the banking sector as the use of high 
leverages, deficiency of liquidity buffers, low efficiency of corporate governance,  defects of 
internal control, and incentive mechanism loopholes (Acharya et al. 2009; Simpson 2010; 
Vines et al. 2011). The importance of regulation to banking sector became prominent after 
the crisis and led to subsequent regulatory responses in a belief that effective banking 
                                                        
1Developing countries are defined according to World Economic Outlook (IMF, 2016). 
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supervision could reduce bank risk and improve banking performance. Evidence from 
developed countries shows that regulatory strategy enhances the accuracy of information 
disclosure and reduces the degree of corruption in the banking sector (Beck et al. 2006; 
Klomp and Haan 2012). Strengthened capital controls and improved regulatory capacity of 
governments increase the operational efficiency of European banks (Chortareas et al. 2012). 
Most developing countries also strengthened bank regulation as a response to the global 
financial crisis in 2008. Limited evidence shows that bank regulation, especially capital 
regulation, also reduces bank risk in developing countries (Klomp and Haan 2014).  
We contribute to the literature by conducting a comprehensive research on the 
association between national regulation, the identity of the large bank owner, and bank risk in 
43 developing countries for the sample period of 2004-2012. Based on World Bank surveys 
conducted by Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2008, 2013), we self-construct the total national 
regulation scores as well as twelve subcategory regulation scores on entry to banking sector, 
ownership, capital requirement, activities restrictions, etc. We measure bank risk by three 
means: (1) a self-constructed total risk based on Capital adequacy, Asset qualities, 
Management costs, Earnings and profitability, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to market risk 
(CAMELS); (2) credit rating risk; and (3) inverted z score for insolvency risk.  
When the identity of the large bank owner is excluded from the analyses, the total 
regulation significantly reduces bank risk, regardless the risk measurement, similar to Klomp 
and Hann (2012, 2014). Our empirical evidence that bank risk varies positively with 
ownership concentration is also consistent with Laeven and Levine (2009). However, 
contradictory to Saunders et al. (1990) and Laeven and Levine (2009), we find that large 
bank owner reduces bank risk in developing countries. Furthermore, national bank regulation 
and the identity of the large bank owner have significant joint effects on bank risk. Bank risk 
is significantly reduced in most developing countries where the national bank regulation 
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became more stringent in 2008 as a response to the crisis. However, in fourteen countries that 
experienced deregulation in the post-crisis period, banks take more risk, supporting the 
positive association between bank risk and deregulation evidenced in Saunders et al. (1990). 
Our investigation to the impact of twelve sub-categories of regulation on bank risk 
shows that regulations on capital adequacy, activity restriction, external auditing requirement, 
depositor protection scheme, and information disclosure are negatively associated with bank 
risk in developing countries, regardless the risk measurements. Total regulation and relevant 
subcategory regulations are efficient in improving asset quality, boosting liquidity, and 
decreasing bank sensitivity to market risk in developing countries. However, regulations 
increase management costs and hamper bank profitability. 
Overall, our findings suggest that bank regulation is efficient in reducing bank risk but 
the marginal effect of national bank regulation on bank risk varies with not only the 
controlling power but also the identity of the large owner of banks. In addition to academic 
contributions to the relevant literature, empirical evidence reported in our paper has political 
implications for bank regulators in developing countries. For example, our results imply that 
banks in developing countries can do better financially if they focus on banking business 
rather than expanding activities into securities, insurance, real estate or investment in non-
financial firms. This provides an important rationale for regulatory restrictions on non-
banking activities of banks in some developing countries like China. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains why and how 
national bank regulation and the identity of the large owner shape bank risk in developing 
countries. Section 3 details the measurements of bank risk, self-construction of regulation and 
the identity of the large bank owners. Section 4 describes the empirical models. Section 5 
justifies the sample selection and reports descriptive statistics of regression variables. Section 
6 reports the empirical analyses results. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
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2. Bank Risk Shaped by Regulation and Large Owners 
2.1 How National Regulation Shapes Bank Risk? 
Keeley (1990) develops a theoretical framework for the impact of regulation on bank 
risk and shows that deregulation of American banking sector increases bank incentives to 
take on extra risk, thus increasing the risk of failure. The prediction of this theoretical 
framework is supported by empirical evidence provided by Saunders et al. (1990). Prior 
studies cover selected aspects of regulations. For example, Agoraki et al. (2011) consider 
capital requirements, restriction on activities, and supervisory power. Laeven and Levine 
(2009) examine deposit insurance, capital regulations, and regulatory restrictions on bank 
activities. Extant literature offers a mixed view on how regulation in these aspects influence 
bank risk as detailed below. 
Klomp and Haan (2012) find that market entry regulation reduces capital and asset 
risk of banks. Few other prior studies examine the impact of the entry regulation on bank risk. 
Based on the assumption that market entry regulation reduces the competition in a banking 
industry, prior studies on competition and bank risk concludes that banks take more risk 
when facing increased competition. Boyd and Nicolo (2005) confront this common 
perception and find that banks may also become riskier as the markets become more 
concentrated.   
More stringent capital adequacy requirements lead banks to set stricter acceptance 
criteria for granting new loans, resulting in a more prudent, less-risky behaviour (Bolt and 
Tieman 2004). However, regulation on capital requirement harms franchise value, 
encourages gambling (Hellmann et al. 2000), and increases a bank’s riskiness (Blum 1999). 
Hence, capital requirement may not be enough and additional regulation such as deposit rate 
controls, deposit premiums or asset restrictions could be useful in reducing risk within a 
competitive environment (Matutes and Vives 2000; Repullo 2004).  
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Deposit insurance is a corner stone of many banking systems worldwide because it 
helps protect small savers and prevents bank runs (Lambert et al. 2017). If the bank is a 
monopoly or banks are competing only in the loan market, deposit insurance has no influence 
on risk-taking of banks (Niinimaki 2004). Explicit deposit insurance reduces the risk of 
European banks in the 1990s (Gropp and Vesala 2004). Empirical evidence for a sample of 
banks worldwide shows that deposit insurance decreases bank risk during the crisis period 
2007–2009 but increases bank risk during normal time (Anginer et al. 2014). Other empirical 
evidence also largely indicates that the existence of a deposit insurance scheme increases 
bank risk (Wheelock and Wilson, 1995; Hovakimian and Kane, 2000; Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 2001; Barth et al. 2004). American banks affected by the 2008 Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act increase their investments in risky commercial real estate loans 
and become riskier relative to unaffected banks (Lambert et al. 2017). 
Extant literature offers mixed evidence on whether bank risk is affected by the 
regulatory restriction on bank activities. Lower restrictions on bank activities lead to more 
competition and encourage greater risk-taking (Claessens and Laeven 2004). However, low 
restrictions could also allow the creation of large financial conglomerates, reducing 
competition in the market (Beck et al. 2004). The activity and branching restriction enforced 
after the financial crises of the 1930s restricted competition and enhanced stability (Beck 
2008). The financial liberalization in the 1970s and 1980s resulted in “unchecked” 
competition leading to banking fragility (Keeley 1990). High reliance on fee-based activities 
is associated with under-priced borrower default risk (Lepetit et al. 2008a) and expansion into 
non-interest income activities increases bank risk of insolvency (Lepetit et al. 2008b). 
A powerful supervisor could improve the governance of banks, promote competition, 
and prevent bank managers to take excessive risk. However, such effects depend on the 
balance of power between banks and supervisors, especially in developing countries. Under 
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the political/regulatory capture view, powerful banks may confine politicians and induce 
supervisors to act in the interest of banks rather than the interest of the society (Stigler, 1971).  
2.2 Risk-taking Behaviour of Banks with Different Large Owners Under National Regulation 
Whether and how the identity of bank owner and bank regulation jointly affect bank 
risk are not yet examined in the literature. Hence, we review here prior studies investigating 
the risk-taking behaviour of banks with different large owners, including governments, 
industrial companies, financial companies, families and foreigners, respectively.  
Extant literature offers mixed evidence on how government owners affect the risk-
taking behaviour of banks or firms they invest. Banks owned by governments tend to take 
more risk and operate less efficiently than those owned by other large owners in both 
developed and developing countries (Cull and Xu 2003; Berger, Hasan and Zhou 2009; Jia 
2009; Saghi-Zedek 2016; Zhu and Yang 2016). Government-owned banks in Europe have 
lower profitability, poorer loan quality and higher insolvency risk than their private 
counterparts (Iannotta, Giacomo, and Andrea 2007). Government-owned banks in developing 
countries have lower profitability and higher costs than their private counterparts (Micco, 
Panizza, and Yannez 2007). Government-owned banks operated less profitably, held less core 
capital, and had greater credit risk than privately-owned banks in southeast Asian counties 
prior to 2001, but the gap closed afterwards (Cornett, et al. 2010). Government-owned banks 
must shoulder political tasks of the government and hence exhibit risk-taking behaviours 
different from those owned by families or companies. Wishing to achieve their political 
goals, government-owned banks tend to bail out poorly-performing state-owned enterprises 
in China and largely ignore their non-performing loans, leading to a typical soft lending 
decision (Cull and Xu 2003). However, state ownership is negatively related to the risk-
taking behaviour of newly privatized firms (Boubakri, Cosset, and Saffar 2013). National 
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regulation is omitted in afore-mentioned studies. We argue that national regulation may have 
more direct effect on government-owned banks than other banks as the regulatory influence 
could be facilitated by the voting power of the government owner. Hence, we conjecture a 
negative effect of the government owner on bank risk, i.e. government-owned banks may 
take less risk than other banks when national bank regulation is taken into consideration. 
Industrial and financial companies with advanced techniques, expertise and 
knowledge may allow banks to manage diverse activities where banks potentially lack 
experience. Banks with a significant presence of such owners could diversify more promptly 
than widely-held banks and enjoy economies of activity diversification (Saghi-Zedek 2016). 
These suggest that banks owned by industrial companies and financial companies may take 
less risk than other banks because of their superior risk diversification.  
Extant literature offers some limited evidence on how family owners shape bank risk 
in developed countries but not in developing countries. European banks controlled by 
families have higher earnings volatility and default risk than those controlled by financial 
institutions or industrial companies (Saghi-Zedek 2016). Family-owned banks limit executive 
management positions to family members, which may restrict their labour pool to obtain 
qualified talents (Saghi-Zedek 2016). Family owners could also see innovation and openness 
as potential threats to their control and might be reluctant to finance innovations (Morck et al. 
1998). The limitation of executive management positions to family members and reluctance 
to finance innovations may be more prominent in developing countries, which will limit 
banks owned by families to manage and diversify risk efficiently. However, the long-term 
orientation of family goal may also impede the bank to pursue risky investment. In addition, 
banks owned by families may be more sensitive to national bank regulation due to their 
smaller size and weaker bargaining power than those owned by governments and companies. 
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Hence, family-owned banks may take less risk than other banks in developing counties with 
stringent regulation. 
Prior evidence on the risk-taking behaviour of foreign banks can be best described as 
mixed. Foreign banks improve the competition in banking sector of developing countries, 
especially in host countries with low banking concentrations (Jeon et al. 2011). However, the 
pursuit of fee-based income by Indian banks, both domestic and foreign, increases risk as 
measured by the volatility of return on assets (Pennathur et al. 2012). Transition countries in 
eastern and central Europe with more foreign banks have reduced non-performing loans but 
high insolvency risk (Agoraki, Delis, and Pasiouras, 2011). Foreign banks tend to have higher 
profit and lower costs than domestic banks in developing countries (Claessens et al. 2001; 
Micco et al. 2007) but lower profit and higher costs than domestic banks in developed 
countries (Claessens et al. 2001). Considering foreign banks in developing countries are 
likely from developed countries, they are expected to be more willing to comply to national 
bank regulation and more prudent in risk-taking than domestic banks. Hence, we predict 
foreign banks to take less risk in developing counties with stringent regulation. 
In a nutshell, different from Saunders et al. (1990) and Laeven and Levine (2009), we 
expect large bank owners (governments, industrial companies, financial companies, families 
and foreigners) to reduce bank risk in developing countries. We also expect significant joint 
effects of bank regulation and the identity of large bank owner on bank risk. These 
conjectures form our below hypotheses for empirical examination: 
H1: Banks with large owners (governments, industrial/financial companies, families and 
foreigners) take less risk in developing countries when national regulation is considered. 
H2: Large bank owners and national regulation have significant joint effects on bank risk in 
developing countries.  
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3. Measurements of Bank Risk, Regulation and Identity of Large Owner 
3.1 Bank Risk Measurements 
The global financial crisis in 2008 has revived attention to risk in the banking sector 
and the ways in which it can be measured. In this paper, we measure bank risk using three 
sets of indicators – the CAMELS indicators, credit rating risk, and inverted z score.  
Our first measurement of bank risk is developed based on the CAMELS indicators 
widely adopted in banking research (Bassett, Lee, and Spiller 2015), including thirteen 
indicators categorized into six aspects - capital adequacy, asset qualities, management costs, 
earnings and profitability, liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk. However, not all CAMELS 
indicators are positive indicators of bank risk. Indicators for capital adequacy, and earnings 
and profitability are expected to be negatively related to bank risk. For example, a low total 
equity to total assets ratio, an indicator for capital adequacy, means a high financial leverage, 
which makes the bank less resilient to shocks, ceteris paribus. An increase in a bank’s 
profitability reduces the likelihood of a distress event. Some indicators of liquidity, such as 
the ratios of liquid assets to total assets or short-term funds, may also be negatively associated 
with bank risk because liquidity leads to risk reduction, lower probability of insolvency risk 
and enhanced bank stability
2
. In constructing total bank risk based on the thirteen CAMELS 
indicators, we take the potential negative associations into account so that all thirteen 
indicators are positively associated with the constructed total risk. We collect the data from 
BankScope of Bureau van Dijk and use one-factor model to calculate an overall indicator 
based on the CAMELS indicators to reflect the total risk of a bank
3
.  
                                                        
2As shown in Table 2, EAR, TCR, ROA, ROE, LAA, and LASFR are negatively related to bank risk while the 
rest CAMELS indicators are positively associated with bank risk. 
3Our one-factor model is based on factor analysis, a statistical method used to describe variability among 
observed, correlated variables in terms of a potentially lower number of unobserved variables called factors. 
Factor analysis helps to deal with data sets where there are a large number of observed variables reflecting a 
small number of underlying or latent variables. We calculate a comprehensive factor for each bank based on the 
thirteen CAMELS indicators. The factor analysis results are available upon request for each sample bank. 
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Our second measurement of bank risk is developed based on credit ratings, which are 
also used in prior studies (Bongini et al. 2002; Iannotta et al. 2013). Credit ratings include 
Fitch Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (FLT), Moody Long-term Rating (MLT) and 
Standard & Poor's Issuer Credit Rating Long- term (S&PLT). We collect all three credit 
ratings from BankScope and convert them into numerical risk scores (as shown in Table A.1) 
so that we can use the proxy for credit ratings of FLT, MLT and S&PLT in regressions. By 
measuring a bank’s probability of default synthetically, the credit rating indicator reflects not 
only a bank’s profitability, asset quality, risk, management quality, and macroeconomic 
conditions, but also the potential support from an external entity such as a parent company, a 
regulatory agency, and a local/national government (Iannotta et al. 2013). 
Thirdly, we measure bank risk using the inverted z-score of each bank, which equals 
to the standard deviation of return on assets (ROA) over the full sample period of 
investigation divided by the sum of current ROA and current total equity to total assets ratio 
(EAR). The z-score measures the distance from insolvency (Roy 1952) and is used widely in 
prior studies on bank risk (Bassett et al. 2015; Bonginiet al. 2002; Chortareas et al. 2012; 
Laeven and Levine 2009). It relates a bank’s capital level to the variability in returns so that 
we know how much variability in returns can be absorbed by capital before the bank becomes 
insolvent, assuming that the capital level can be adjusted downwards in case of loss. However, 
z-score is defined in a way that a low value of z-score indicates a high level of bank risk. We 
use the inverted z-score to measure bank insolvency risk so that the interpretation of 
empirical results is consistent with those for self-constructed total risk and credit rating risk. 
3.2 National Bank Regulation 
Bank regulation has been measured based on two sources in prior literature. 
Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2008) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2011) use an index 
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measuring the extent to which countries adhere to the Core Principles for Effective Bank 
Supervision issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. As compliance with the 
principles is mostly classified information, we use World Bank surveys to compute proxies 
for national bank regulation. In these surveys, Barth et al. (2001, 2003, 2008, 2013) collect 
detailed and comprehensive information on bank regulation and supervision for more than 
107 countries between 1999 and 2012.  
Regulation scores are self-calculated based on the relevant information collected 
manually from two Bank Regulation and Supervision surveys conducted around the recent 
financial crisis by Barth et al. (2008, 2013).
4
 The surveys cover more than 200 questions 
about bank regulation and receive responses from about 100 jurisdictions by the country’s 
central bank or other related institutions. According to the nature of questions covered in 
World Bank’s survey (2008, 2013), we classify the bank regulation indicators into twelve 
categories: (1) entry into banking; (2) ownership; (3) capital requirement; (4) activities 
restrictions; (5) external auditing requirements; (6) internal management/organizational 
requirements; (7) liquidity and risk diversification; (8) depositor (saving) protection schemes; 
(9) asset classification provisioning and write-offs; (10) accounting/ information disclosure; 
(11) discipline/problem institutions/exit; and (12) supervision
5
. Our construction of total 
regulation scores follows a three-step procedure.
6
 We firstly select 132 questions that can be 
numerically scored and unify the numerical answers so that higher scores correspond to 
stricter regulations. We then group the survey questions with numerical answers into the 
twelve categories as discussed above to generate the subcategory regulation scores. In the 
                                                        
4 http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20345037~pag
ePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html 
5 Pasiouras et al. (2006) and Klomp and Haan (2014) classify the bank regulation indicators into seven 
categories: (1) capital requirement; (2) private monitoring; (3) activities restrictions; (4) supervisory control; (5) 
deposit insurer’s power; (6) liquidity; and (7) market entry regulations. 
6  The detailed construction of regulation score for each of the sample country based on the World Bank 
questions is available from the authors upon request. 
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final step, total regulation scores are generated as the sum of all twelve subcategory 
regulation scores.
7
 
3.3 Large Bank Owners 
Following Caprio, Laeven, and Levine (2007) and Laeven and Levine (2009), we 
classify a bank as having a large owner if the largest shareholder has direct and indirect 
voting rights that sum to 10% or more. A widely-held bank is defined as one with no 
shareholder holding 10% of the voting rights or more. According to the identity of the large 
bank owner from BankScope database, we categorize banks into six groups - banks owned by 
governments, industrial companies, financial companies, families, foreign owners, and banks 
with no large owner, respectively. 
4.Empirical Models 
Our baseline regression model is shown in below Eq. (1). 
                                                          
 
            (1) 
where, Bank Riskijt is the risk of bank i in country j at time t, which is measured as the total 
risk based on the CAMELS indicators, credit rating score, and inverted z-score, respectively. 
Regulationijt is measured as the total regulation or twelve subcategory regulations faced by 
bank i in country j at time t. Ck represents bank-level and country level control variables.
8
 
In Eq.(1), we regress bank risk indicators on bank regulation (including total 
regulation and subcategory regulation scores) and other control variables. We then introduce 
the identity dummies and shareholding by the controlling owner into Eq.(2). Five dummy 
variables are created according to our categorization of large bank owners into governments, 
industrial companies, financial companies, families, and foreign owners. In addition to the 
                                                        
7 We have also tried to use the factor analysis to construct the total regulation scores but realized this approach 
unsuitable. The extraction and rotation sums of squared loadings in the post-crisis period of 2008-2012 are about 
57% and much lower than the acceptable threshold of 70%. 
8Please refer to Table A.2 for the definitions and data sources of all variables. 
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identity dummies of large bank owners, we also consider in Eq.(2) the influence of the total 
shareholding by controlling shareholder as a measurement of ownership concentration.  
                                                                    
 
            
(2) 
where Ownerijt represents the identity of bank i’s large owner in country j at time t; and other 
variables are defined the same as those in Eq. (1). 
We further include the interaction terms of national regulation scores and the dummy 
variables for different identity of large owner and the shareholding by the controlling owner 
into Eq. (3). The coefficient    captures the joint effects of national regulation and the 
identity of large owner on risk-taking behaviour of banks.  
                                                  
                                           
 
   
        
                                                            (3) 
where                        is the interaction term between the national regulation and 
the identity of the bank owner in country j at time t; and other variables are defined the same 
as those in Eq. (2). 
Prior studies on bank risk usually adopt the ordinary least square and panel 
regressions (Laeven and Levine 2009). Panel regression is beneficial in accounting for 
between-firm cross-sectional variations and within-firm temporal changes over time. 
However, this method can be inflicted with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation problems. 
Therefore, we estimate our equations using Arellano-Bond dynamic panel regression. The 
general method of moments (GMM) estimator in the dynamic panel regression controls for 
heteroskedasticity and autoregression related to bank risk over time while the lagged 
dependent variable accounts for the impact of previous bank risk on current and future bank 
risk (Arellano and Bond 1991). In addition to addressing the heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation issues, the Arellano-Bond dynamic model also help reduce endogeneity 
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concerns as its fixed effects ameliorate concerns about firm-level omitted variable bias. We 
further include year dummies in the dynamic model to mitigate time-varying unobserved 
heterogeneity bias. In dynamic panel regression model, simultaneity in independent variables 
can be handled by lagging the instruments once, which allows for exogeneity tests using the 
J-statistics. The two stage least squared J-statistics, also called Sargan’s statistics, are hence 
reported for all regressions reported in our paper.  
5. Sample Selection and Summary Statistics 
Country level regulation scores are only available until 2012 from World Bank’s 
surveys by Barth et al. (2013). We collect data for 3,213 observations of 357 banks from 43 
developing countries during the sample period of 2004-2012, which covers four years before 
the global financial crisis in 2008 and four years afterwards. We choose 43 sample countries 
based on the criteria of developing countries in World Economic Outlook (Barth et al. 2013), 
the consistency of the World Bank’s questionnaires, and the availability of bank-level data 
from BankScope. We start with about 70 developing jurisdictions covered in the World 
Bank’s surveys (Barth et al. 2008, 2013) but have to drop 27 sample countries due to the data 
availability from BankScope. After excluding duplicated bank records and inactive banks 
from BankScope database, 1,028 commercial banks remain for the 43 sample countries, 
which further reduces to 357 commercial banks due to data availability for bank-level 
variables. Our final sample, including 268 unlisted banks and 89 listed banks, provides a 
reasonable representation of banks in developing countries. Amongst the 357 sample banks, 
197 banks have large owners and 113 banks have credit ratings as detailed in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
Table 2 shows the calculations of the thirteen CAMELS indicators, their predicted 
associations with bank risk, and means for all sample banks and banks with different large 
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owners, respectively. Banks owned by governments and industrial companies have more 
adequate capital than family-owned banks and foreign banks. Banks owned by financial 
companies have the least adequate capital. Government-owned banks have the best asset 
quality, followed by those owned by industrial companies. Family-owned banks are more 
efficient in curbing management costs and hence more profitable than other banks in 
developing countries. They also have the highest liquid assets to total assets ratios, but 
government-owned banks have the highest liquid assets to short-term funds ratios. Family-
owned banks have the highest total interest expenses to total deposits ratios, but foreign 
banks have the highest government securities to total assets ratios. 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics of bank risk measured by total risk measurement 
based on the CAMELS indicators, credit rating score and inverted z score. In addition to 
reporting descriptive statistics for all sample banks, Table 3 also categorises sample banks 
according to their controlling owners into five groups as discussed in the previous section. 
The risk level ranking amongst the five categories of large owners varies when risk is 
measured using different indicators. Mean comparison of total risk measurement based on the 
CAMELS indicators suggests that banks controlled by financial companies take the most risk. 
Foreign banks are riskier than those controlled by industrial companies followed by banks 
owned by families; banks controlled by governments take the least risk. Mean comparison of 
credit rating scores shows that family-owned banks have the highest credit risk. Banks owned 
by industrial companies have higher credit risk than those owned by governments, followed 
by foreign banks. Those owned by financial companies have the least credit risk, implying 
that such owners may reduce bank default risk through the synergetic benefit, information 
advantage or risk diversification. Mean comparison of inverted z score measured for 
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insolvency risk implies that banks owned by industrial companies and financial companies 
have lower insolvency risk than those owned by governments, families, and foreigners.  
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for main variables used in our empirical 
analyses. Statistics for the bank-level CAMELS indicators, the identities of different large 
owners and other firm characteristics are summarized in Panel A. Those for national 
regulation scores and economic variables are reported in Panel B and Panel C, respectively. 
Most bank-level data are collected from BankScope and some data for Chinese banks are 
collected from CSMAR Solution. Other than the self-constructed regulation scores and the 
indicator for IMF Assistant Program (IMFassis) collected from IMF annual reports, all other 
country-level data are collected from worldwide governance indicators of World Bank.  
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
Table 5 reports correlation coefficients for main variables used in regression analyses. 
None of these variables are highly correlated. Hence, multicollinearity is not a concern in our 
empirical analyses of Eq. (1-3). 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
6. Empirical Results 
6.1 Bank Risk, National Regulation and Large Owners 
Regression results for Eq. (1-3) are reported in Table 6. When the ownership level and 
the identity of the large owner are excluded from the regression, the total regulation reduces 
bank risk significantly, no matter how it is measured. The negative association between 
regulation and bank risk remains significant after including the identity dummies and the total 
shareholdings of large owners. However, the significance of the coefficient for regulation is 
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lost when interaction terms are included in regressions where bank risk is measured by credit 
ratings and inverted z score. 
When bank risk is measured based on the CAMELS indicators, the coefficients for the 
five identity dummies of large bank owners are all significant. Banks owned by governments, 
industrial companies, families, and foreigners take less risk than widely-held banks, but those 
owned by financial companies take more risk than others. In their pursuit of profit 
maximization, financial companies may have incentives to encourage their owned banks to 
bypass the political regulation on banking business, leading to more risk-taking behaviours of 
banks in developing countries. Our finding that the family-owned banks have lower total risk 
is contradictory to the findings for European banks in Saghi-Zedek (2016). After considering 
the joint effects of the identity of the large owner and national regulation on bank risk in 
regression analyses, we find that the coefficients of the dummy variables for banks owned by 
industrial companies, families, and foreigners remain significantly negative, implying risk 
reduction in these banks. However, the significance of government owner in reducing total 
risk is lost after including the interaction terms between the identity of the large owner and 
total regulation. The coefficients for all these interaction terms, except for governments, are 
significantly positive, suggesting that national regulation is less efficient in reducing risk of 
banks owned by industrial companies, financial companies, families, and foreigners than 
banks owned by governments or those with no large owner.  
When bank risk is proxied by credit ratings, the coefficients for the five identity 
dummies of large bank owners are mostly significant. Family-owned banks have higher 
credit rating risk whereas banks owned by foreigners, governments, and financial companies 
face lower credit rating risk than those with no large owner. Coefficients for the interaction 
terms between regulation and large owners suggest that the national bank regulation is less 
efficient in reducing credit risk of banks owned by governments, industrial companies, and 
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financial companies than other banks in developing countries. The significantly negative 
coefficient for the interaction between family-owned banks and regulation suggests that 
national bank regulation reduces bank credit risk more efficiently in these banks than others.  
When bank risk is measured as the inverted z-score, all five types of large bank 
owners reduce bank insolvency risk as indicated by the significantly negative coefficients of 
bank owner identity dummies. The coefficients for the interaction terms between national 
bank regulation and most large bank owners are significantly positive, suggesting that the 
insolvency risk reduction effect of national bank regulation decreases in banks owned by 
governments, industrial companies, financial companies, and families. National bank 
regulation and family owner jointly reduce bank risk-taking behaviour. However, these 
empirical results for joint effects must be interpreted with cautions because the regression 
with the interaction terms of regulation and the identity of the large owner does not pass the 
Sagan test, as shown in the last column of Table 6.  
Overall, banks owned by governments, industrial companies and foreign banks take 
less risk than those with no large owner, which is consistently observed in regressions 
regardless of the bank risk measurement. Banks owned by financial companies have lower 
credit rating risk and insolvency risk than those widely held. Family-owned banks also have 
lower insolvency risk and total risk than those with no large owner. These findings support 
our prediction in H1. The results are fairly robust for banks owned by governments, industrial 
companies and foreign banks across different bank risk measurements. However, family-
owned banks have a high credit rating risk. Bank owned by financial companies have a high 
total risk based on the CAMELS indicators, although such effect disappears after including 
the interaction term with bank regulation.  
National regulation and the identity of the large owner also jointly shape bank risk in 
developing countries. In particular, industrial companies and financial companies as bank 
  
21 
 
owners have positive joint effects with regulation on bank risk. This empirical evidence is 
robust regardless of the bank risk measurement. Other identities of bank owners also have 
significant joint effects with regulation on bank risk, but the direction of the joint effect varies 
with the bank risk measurement. As such, our prediction in H2 for significant joint effects 
between bank regulation and the identity of the large owner on bank risk is supported by 
empirical results reported in Table 6.  
The controlling power of large owners measured as their total shareholding is 
positively associated with bank credit rating risk but negatively associated with inverted z-
score when the interaction with national regulation is taken into consideration. The 
coefficients of interaction terms between the total shareholding level of large owners and 
regulation suggest that national regulation reduces bank credit rating risk more efficiently 
when large bank owners possess more shareholding but the opposite for insolvency risk. The 
coefficients for other control variables are largely significant, suggesting that these bank-level 
and national-level factors shape bank risk as well. However, we notice that the sign of the 
coefficients changes when bank risk is measured differently.  
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
Not all twelve subcategory regulations reduce bank risk in the same way. For the 
completeness of our research, we also analyse how each of the twelve subcategory 
regulations affects bank risk measured by the CAMELS indicators, credit rating risk and 
inverted z score, respectively. Table 7 summarizes these regression results.
9
 Our finding that 
regulation on capital adequacy requirement reduces bank risk is consistent with Bolt and 
Tieman (2004) but opposite to Blum (1999) and Hellmann et al. (2000). In addition, national 
regulations on bank activities (ActivitiesR), external auditing requirement (ExAuditR), 
depositor protection scheme (DepositR), accounting information disclosure (DisclosureR), 
                                                        
9We only report the summarized results in Table 7 due to the length of the paper. Please refer to appendices 
Table A.4a-c for detailed regression results for Table 7. 
  
22 
 
and supervision also reduce bank risk significantly in developing countries, as suggested by 
the results reported in Table 7. However, regulation on discipline problem and institutions’ 
exit (ExitR) increase bank risk. The regulatory restriction on entry into banking sector 
(EntryR) increases bank risk measured as total risk and credit rating risk, which is 
contradictory to the finding from developed countries in Klomp and Haan (2012). It is 
possible that the regulatory restriction on entry into the banking sector reduces competitions 
within the sector in developing countries. Large bank owners, after entering the market, have 
incentives to increase their expected profit, and in turn, banks with such large owners take 
more risk when the markets become more concentrated. However, regulatory restriction on 
entry into banking sector reduces insolvency risk measured by the inverted z score. Similarly, 
the effect of other sub-categories of regulations (OwnershipR, ManagmenetR, LiquidityR, 
ProvisionR and SupervisionR) on bank risk also vary with its measurement. 
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
We then try to link the sub-categories of regulations to the six aspects of the 
CAMELS indicators and regress the total regulation and the relevant subcategory regulation 
on each of the six aspects.  
6.2 Bank Capital Adequacy, National Regulation and Large Owners 
Firstly, we check the impact of total regulation and subcategory regulation (capital 
requirement) on capital adequacy of our sample banks as measured by the total equity to total 
assets ratio (EAR) and total capital ratio (TCR), respectively. According to Table 8, total 
regulation and capital regulation increase the former but decrease the latter. Since the TCR is 
internally calculated by banks, the negative relation between this ratio and total regulation 
may suggest that banks in countries with stringent regulations calculate their TCR more 
conservatively than those in countries with less stringent regulations.   
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Large owners like governments, industrial companies, financial companies, and 
families are positively associated with both proxies for bank capital adequacy, suggesting that 
banks with these types of large owners are more likely to have the adequate capital for bank 
runs. Foreign banks have higher EAR ratio but lower TCR ratio than other banks, possibly 
because they calculate the TCR ratio more conservatively than domestic banks in developing 
countries. The negative coefficients for the shareholding by the controlling owner imply that 
their controlling power reduces bank capital adequacy. 
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
6.3 Bank Asset Quality, National Regulation and Large Owners 
Table 9 reports regression results for the impact of the total regulation and the 
subcategory regulation (asset classification provisioning and write-offs) on bank asset quality 
measured by the loan loss provision to total loans ratio (LLR) and impaired loan ratio (ILR). 
The regression results show that both ratios decrease with the total regulation score. 
However, the effect of subcategory regulation on asset classification provisioning and write-
offs on asset quality is sensitive to the presence of large owners in banks. When the dummy 
variables for large owners are excluded in the regression, subcategory regulation on asset 
classification provisioning and write-offs seems to improve asset quality by reducing both the 
loan loss provision and the impaired loan. However, when we take large owners of banks into 
consideration, this subcategory of regulation is positively associated with the ratio of the loan 
loss provision to total loans only. Loan loss provisions and non-performing loans are reduced 
in banks owned by governments, industrial companies and foreign banks but increased in 
family banks. Mixed results are evidenced for banks owned by financial companies and 
shareholding of the controlling bank owner. 
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
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6.4 Bank Management Costs, National Regulation and Large Owners 
Table 10 reports the regression results for the total regulation and the subcategory 
regulation (internal management and organizational requirements) on bank management 
costs. We find that total regulation is positively associated with the total cost to total income 
ratio (CIR) and the overhead cost to total assets ratio (OCA). Management/organizational 
requirement increases both ratios when ownership variables are excluded from regressions. 
However, when we include the identity of the large bank owner in regressions, this 
subcategory of regulation has a negative association with the ratio of total cost to total 
income. Management cost is negatively associated with banks owned by governments, 
industrial companies, financial companies, and families but positively associated with foreign 
banks, suggesting they manage cost less efficiently than domestic banks. Management cost of 
banks also increase with the shareholding of the controlling bank owner. 
[Insert Table 10 Here] 
6.5 Bank Profitability, National Regulation and Large Owners 
Out of the twelve subcategory regulations, the restriction on bank activities, such as 
securities, insurance, real estate and investment in non-financial firms, is likely to have a 
direct impact on bank profitability measured by return on assets (ROA) and return on equity 
(ROE). Hence, we analyse the impact of total regulation and regulatory restriction on bank 
activities on bank profitability with a further consideration of large owners. Empirical results 
for the regressions of total regulation and activities regulation on ROA and ROE, as reported 
in Table 11, show that total regulation reduces bank profitability but regulatory restriction on 
bank activities increases bank profitability in developing countries. The latter finding 
suggests that banks in developing countries can perform better financially by focusing on 
banking business rather than expanding into non-banking activities. This empirical evidence 
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provides further support to Li and Zhang’s (2013) finding that activity diversification 
worsens the risk and return trade-off for the Chinese banking industry. Our finding that banks 
perform better financially by focusing on banking activities provides an important rationale 
for regulatory restrictions on non-banking activities of banks in developing countries
10
.  
Banks owned by governments, industrial companies, financial companies and families 
are more profitable than those with no large owner. Foreign banks generate higher returns for 
shareholders but lower returns for their debtholders than widely-held banks. The shareholding 
by the controlling owner is also negatively associated with bank profitability. 
[Insert Table 11 Here] 
6.6 Bank Liquidity, National Regulation and Large Owners 
Table 12 reports the regression results for the impacts of total regulation and 
subcategory regulation (liquidity and risk diversification) on bank liquidity proxied by the 
liquid assets to total assets ratio (LAA), the liquid assets to short-term funds ratio (LASFR), 
and the total loans to deposits ratio (TLD).  Bank assets are more liquid when the former two 
ratios are high and the TLD ratio is low. Both total regulation and subcategory regulation on 
liquidity and risk diversification increase LAA and LASFR but decrease TLD, suggesting 
that they improve bank liquidity in developing countries. The identity of the large owner also 
matters for bank liquidity. Banks owned by government and financial companies have fewer 
liquid assets that other banks. However, the impact of other owners on bank liquidity varies 
across different liquidity ratios. The shareholding by the controlling owner is positively 
associated with bank liquidity, especially measured by the LASFR ratio. 
[Insert Table 12 Here] 
                                                        
10 For instance, banks in China are prohibited from investing in the stock market. 
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6.7 Bank Sensitivity to Market Risk, National Regulation and Large Owners 
We regress total regulation and subcategory regulation on supervision on bank 
sensitivity to market risk measured by the total interest expenses to total deposits (TIETD) 
ratio and the government securities to total assets (GSTA) ratio. Both ratios are positive 
indicators of bank sensitivity to market risk, especially interest rate risk. Regression results 
reported in Table 13 show that both total regulation and the subcategory regulation on 
supervision decrease the TIETD ratio and the GSTA ratio. Banks owned by governments and 
financial companies have lower TIETD ratios but higher GSTA ratios than other banks, 
suggesting a mixed impact of these large owners on bank sensitivity to market risk. Banks 
owned by industrial companies have lower TIETD ratios and GSTA ratios than other banks. 
Family-owned banks have higher TIETD and GSTA ratios than other banks and hence are 
more sensitive to market risk. On the contrary, foreign banks have lower TIETD ratios than 
domestic banks, implying their less sensitivity to market risk. Foreign banks have lower 
GSTA ratios when total regulation is used in the regression but higher GSTA ratios under 
subcategory regulation on supervision, implying that such owner’s impact on the GSTA ratio 
of banks is sensitive to regulation. The shareholding by the controlling owner is positively 
associated with the TIETD ratio but negatively associated with the GSTA ratio, revealing a 
mixed impact on bank sensitivity to market risk. 
[Insert Table 13 Here] 
6.8 Changes in Bank Risk, Changes in National Regulation and Deregulation 
Table A.3 presents the self-constructed bank regulation scores based on the World 
Bank Surveys by sample countries during our sample period of 2004-2012. As shown in 
Table A.3, our self-constructed bank regulation scores vary across different developing 
countries, which offers an ideal context to examine how national bank regulation influences 
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bank risk in developing countries. Furthermore, the total regulation score is persistent with 
limited variation over time for most countries, which alleviates the concern for a reverse 
causality, i.e. bank risk affects bank regulation (Klomp and Haan 2012). 
According to Table A.3, almost all the sample developing countries experienced 
drastic changes in bank regulation between 2007 and 2008, attributed to the global financial 
crisis, while the regulation scores before and after it are almost constant over time. Therefore, 
we focus on changes in national regulation and bank risk from 2007 to 2008 and conduct 
further cross-sectional analyses by computing the changes of regulation and bank risk 
between 2007 and 2008. Based on previous findings that bank risk is reduced when national 
regulation becomes more stringent, we expect a negative association between changes in 
bank risk and changes in national regulation scores. Although most of our sample countries 
strengthened bank regulations in 2008, fourteen sample countries experienced deregulation, 
i.e. their regulation scores decreased after the crisis as shown in Table A.3. The banks in 
sample countries that experienced deregulation may take more risk than those in other 
countries that strengthened their national bank regulation.  
Both conjectures are supported by the empirical results reported in Table 14. We 
conduct ordinary least squared regression to first difference transformation of our Eq.(1) for 
2007 and 2008 only.
11
 The regression results show that changes in total regulation are 
negatively associated with changes in all three measurements of bank risk in sample 
developing countries. The coefficient of the dummy variable “deregulation” is positive 
regardless how bank risk is measured, confirming banks indeed take more risk in sample 
developing countries that experienced deregulation.  
[Insert Table 14 Here] 
                                                        
11We could not analyse the first difference transformation of Eq. (2) and Eq.(3) of our paper as the owner’s 
identity remains constant between 2007 and 2008. 
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7. Conclusions 
We examine how different bank owners and national bank regulation shape bank risk 
by analysing 357 unlisted and listed banks across 43 developing countries during the sample 
period of 2004-2012. National bank regulation scores are self-constructed based on World 
Bank Surveys by Barth et al. (2008, 2013) and include twelve subcategories. Bank risk is 
measured by three means: (1) a self-constructed total risk based on thirteen CAMELS 
indicators; (2) credit rating risk; and (3) inverted z score for insolvency risk. 
We provide new evidence that the presence of large owners and national bank 
regulation in general reduce bank risk but the marginal effect of regulation on bank risk 
varies with the identity of the large owner. Bank regulation and certain types of large owners 
like governments, industrial companies, and foreigners reduce bank risk in developing 
countries, regardless the measurement of bank risk, after controlling the shareholding level of 
large owners, bank-level characteristics and country-level factors. Financial companies and 
families as bank owners also have significant impacts on bank risk but the direction of their 
impacts varies with the measurement of bank risk. More importantly, national regulation and 
the identity of the large owner jointly shape bank risk in developing countries. The risk-
reduction effect of national bank regulation is reduced in bank owned by government, 
industrial companies and financial companies. Other identities of bank owners, i.e. foreigners 
and families, also have significant joint effects with regulation on bank risk, but the direction 
of the joint effect varies with the measurement of bank risk.  
We further investigate whether each of the twelve subcategories of regulation reduces 
bank risk. Regulations on capital adequacy, activity restriction, external auditing requirement, 
depositor protection scheme, and information disclosure are efficient in reducing bank risk in 
developing countries, regardless of the risk measurement. However, regulations on discipline 
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problem and institutions’ exit increase bank risk in developing countries. The impact of other 
subcategory regulations on bank risk varies with the risk measurement.  
We then examine the impact of total regulation and relevant subcategory regulations 
on the thirteen CAMELS indicators that capture bank capital adequacy, asset quality, 
management cost, profitability, liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk. Overall, national 
bank regulations improve asset quality, boost liquidity, and decrease bank sensitivity to 
market risk in developing countries. However, regulations increase management costs and 
hamper profitability of banks in developing countries. Large bank owners have significant 
impacts on the CAMELS indicators, but the direction of the impact varies between different 
owners, which echoes the necessity to consider the identity of large bank owners in analysing 
bank risk. 
Although the dynamic panel regression method adopted in our empirical analyses 
alleviates concerns on endogeneity and simultaneity issues, we further conduct regression 
analyses on changes in bank regulation and bank risk during the financial crisis period to 
check the robustness of our findings for the impact of regulation on bank risk. Bank 
regulators of most developing countries made the national regulations more stringent in 2008, 
especially those on capital regulations, deposit insurer’s power, and supervisory control, as a 
response to the outburst of financial crisis in 2007. We show that increases in national 
regulation scores lead to declines in bank risk between 2007 and 2008. Interestingly, banks in 
the fourteen sample countries that experienced deregulation in 2008 take more risk than those 
in other countries that strengthened regulations, confirming a positive association between 
bank risk and deregulation.  
In addition to the academic contributions to literature, empirical evidence reported in 
our paper also has political implications for bank regulators in developing countries. For 
example, our findings imply that banks in developing countries can do better financially by 
  
30 
 
focusing on banking business rather than expanding activities into securities, insurance, real 
estate or investment in non-financial firms. This finding provides an important rationale for 
regulatory restrictions on non-banking activities of banks in developing countries. More 
importantly, bank regulators in developing countries should be aware the distinct effects on 
the risk of banks owned by different types of large owners and consider the incentives of 
large bank owners in regulating the banking sector.   
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Table 1  
Sample Banks by Countries.  
 
Country All Banks Sample Banks Banks with Large Owner Banks with Credit Rating 
Argentina 17 12 7 7 
Armenia 7 3 2 2 
Bahrain 11 4 1 2 
Belarus 7 4 4 2 
Botswana 13 5 5 0 
Brazil 8 3 2 1 
Bulgaria 15 5 4 5 
Chile 27 2 2 2 
China  153 16 16 9 
Columbia 35 10 7 2 
Croatia 6 4 3 1 
Egypt 24 15 11 2 
Guatemala 11 5 4 0 
Guyana 5 2 2 0 
Honduras 12 5 4 0 
Hungary 7 6 3 1 
India 119 5 5 3 
Jordan 19 11 2 2 
Kazakhstan 16 4 3 3 
Kenya 24 22 10 1 
Kuwait 30 17 4 12 
Lebanon 16 5 4 0 
Luxembourg 71 37 7 2 
Malaysia 41 13 12 2 
Mali 9 4 3 0 
Mexico 74 35 6 5 
Nicaragua 4 1 1 0 
Niger 23 9 6 6 
Nigeria 14 8 0 6 
Oman 13 8 3 4 
Pakistan 12 3 2 1 
Panama 45 8 6 3 
Peru 25 4 3 3 
Philippines 18 7 3 4 
Poland 3 2 2 0 
Romania 20 7 7 1 
Russia 39 5 5 4 
Senegal 12 7 5 0 
South Africa 12 6 4 3 
Thailand 12 7 4 2 
Togo 8 4 1 0 
Uruguay 23 13 9 9 
Venezuela 8 4 3 1 
Total 1,068 357 197 113 
Table 1 shows the numbers of all banks in sample developing countries, sample banks selected, banks with large 
owners and those with credit ratings. Out of 1,068 banks in our sample countries, we select 357 sample banks 
based on their data availability. Large owners with more than 10% ownership present in 197 out of the 357 
sample banks. Information on credit rating is only available for 113 out of 357 sample banks. 
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Table 2 
CAMELS Banking Soundness Indicators and Summary Statistics by Bank Owners. 
CAMELs indicators Calculations Lags Potential relation to 
bank risk 
All 
Banks 
Government Industrial Financial Family Foreign 
Capital Adequacy          
EAR (Total equity/total assets)            
           
      
1 negative 14.64 17.86 17.89 11.13 14.95 12.50 
TCR (Total capital ratio)                
                  
      
1 negative 21.80 22.57 22.81 18.59 21.11 19.47 
Asset Quality          
LLR (Loan loss provision/total loans)                  
          
      
-1 positive 5.82 8.72 5.53 3.98 5.52 4.27 
ILR (Impaired loan ratio)             
          
      
-1 positive 7.81 9.73 7.34 6.34 4.29 6.74 
Management Cost          
CIR (Total cost/total income)          
           
      
-1 positive 61.55 56.46 56.03 58.61 46.11 59.44 
OCA (Overhead cost/total assets)             
           
      
-1 positive 3.68 3.21 4.12 3.63 2.78 3.82 
Earnings and Profitability          
ROA (Return on assets)       
           
      
0 negative 11.91 1.75 1.46 1.72 2.89 1.87 
ROE (Return on equity)       
           
      
0 negative 1.54 11.27 13.02 15.22 17.23 14.80 
Liquidity          
LAA (Liquid assets/total assets)             
           
      
0 negative 30.92 28.17 28.57 29.35 33.71 28.89 
LASFR (Liquid assets/short-term 
funds) 
            
               
      
0 negative 52.94 73.96 62.23 42.53 45.94 44.08 
TLD (Total loans/deposits)           
        
      
0 positive 62.61 64.42 65.46 65.09 59.15 64.56 
Sensitivity to Market Risk          
TIETD (Total interest expenses/total 
deposits) 
                     
             
      
0 positive 4.07 4.91 5.18 3.63 6.15 3.91 
GSTA (Government securities/total 
assets) 
                    
           
      
0 positive 12.52 10.80 9.84 13.22 12.11 13.87 
Table 2 explains the CAMELS banking soundness indicators and their calculation, lags and relation to bank risk/distress. Means of these indicators are reported for all sample banks and banks 
owned by government, industrial companies, financial companies, family and foreigners. Data source: BankScope data 
  
36 
 
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics of Bank Risk by Bank Owners. 
 
Types of bank Variable No. of Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
All Banks 
Total risk 3213 -2.03  9.05  -91.09  29.76  
Credit rating 993 11.00  3.66  1.00  21.00  
Inverted z score 3213 0.11 0.85 -27.84 18.98 
Banks Owned by: 
    Government 
Total risk 576 -3.42  11.99  -91.09  20.47  
Credit rating 286 11.08  3.88  1.00  18.00  
Inverted z score 576 0.12 0.35   -0.75 7.61 
    Industrial Company 
Total risk 260 -2.90  8.81  -50.36  11.50  
Credit rating 100 12.19  3.74  5.00  21.00  
Inverted z score 260 0.10 0.22 0.01 3.17 
    Financial Company 
Total risk 1000 -1.16  7.41  -88.14  18.26  
Credit rating 297 10.63  3.54  3.00  18.00  
Inverted z score 1000 0.10 0.61 -1.17  18.98 
    Family 
Total risk 54 -3.37  4.45  -14.82  5.14  
Credit rating 18 13.19  0.50  12.50  14.00  
Inverted z score 54 0.12 0.08 0.04 0.37 
    Foreign 
  
Total risk 964 -1.36  7.95  -88.14  18.26  
Credit rating 280 10.95  3.84  3.00  21.00  
Inverted z score 964 0.12 0.67 0.01 18.98 
 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for three measurements of bank risk, i.e. total risk, credit rating and inverted z score, in 
all banks and banks with five different types of large owners – government, industrial company, financial company, family 
and foreign. Total risk is self-constructed variables based on the CAMELS indicator discussed in Table 2. Credit rating is 
self-constructed credit rating score based on S&PLT, MLTD, and FLT credit ratings. Inverted bank-level z score is 
calculated as σROA/(ROA+EAR).  
  
37 
 
Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics for Regression Variables. 
 
Panel A: Bank-Level Variables Panel B: Country-level Regulation Variables Panel C: Other Country-level Variables 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max  N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
EAR 3213 14.64 14.20 0.15 99.58 EntryR 3213 10.75 2.04 8.00 16.00 NExport 3213 1.77 11.07 -25.55 45.45 
TCR 3213 21.80 12.49 1.15 93.35 OwnershipR 3213 6.33 1.99 2.00 11.73 Inflation 3213 5.93 5.08 -3.10 59.22 
LLR 3213 5.82 9.43 0.02 98.95 CapitalR 3213 5.55 2.29 -0.12 10.31 GDPG 3213 4.79 3.74 -7.82 14.20 
ILR 3213 7.81 11.39 0.00 87.00 ActivitiesR 3213 10.13 2.51 4.00 15.00 TTS 3213 114.57 38.06 21.40 262.09 
CIR 3213 61.55 34.58 5.73 378.14 ExAuditR 3213 8.28 1.23 4.00 10.00 RIR 3213 3.28 5.72 -9.87 44.64 
OCA 3213 3.68 3.36 0.03 51.77 ManagementR 3213 0.87 0.34 0.00 1.00 IRD 3213 6.02 3.82 -2.81 39.51 
ROE 3213 11.91 18.58 -120.33 156.08 LiquidityR 3213 3.73 1.15 0.00 6.00 GDPPC 3213 17095.20 29321.75 234.91 113240.00 
ROA 3212 1.54 3.85 -49.27 44.00 DepositR 3213 3.43 2.47 0.00 8.00 M2R 3213 3.24 1.47 0.53 12.43 
LAA 3213 30.92 21.71 1.01 98.92 ProvisionR 3213 3.14 1.97 0.00 18.86 Concentration 3213 59.28 18.86 22.53 100.00 
LASFR 3213 52.94 75.92 0.17 825.89 DisclosureR 3213 5.75 1.16 2.90 8.00 SMC 3213 69.21 54.93 0.65 252.42 
TLD 3205 62.61 18.59 16.33 98.22 ExitR 3213 6.97 1.82 3.00 11.00 FB 3213 45.43 27.78 0.00 96.00 
TIETD 3205 4.07 3.61 0.09 31.91 SupervisionR 3213 7.74 2.23 0.00 13.00 Crisis 3213 0.1 0.3 0 1 
GSTA 3213 12.52 11.50 0.01 83.60 TotalR 3213 72.67 7.84 39.55 90.01 IMFassis 3213 0.15 0.35 0 1 
Government 3213 0.18 0.38 0 1             
Industrial 3213 0.08 0.27 0 1             
Financial 3213 0.31 0.46 0 1             
Family 3213 0.02 0.13 0 1             
Foreign 3213 0.30 0.46 0 1             
Shareholding 3213 45.29 44.55 0 100             
Lnta 3213 14.53 3.11 8.71 28.66             
 
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics for variables used in regression analyses. The thirteen CAMELS indicators include total equity/total assets (EAR), total capital ratio (TCR), loan loss 
provision/total loans (LLR), impaired loan ratio (ILR), total cost/total income (CIR), overhead cost/total assets (OCA), return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), liquid assets/total assets 
(LAA), liquid assets/short-term funds (LASFR), total interest expenses/total deposits (TIETD), and government securities/total assets (GSTA). Bank-level ownership variables include five 
dummies (government, industrial, financial, family and foreign) and the shareholding by the large owner (shareholding). Lnta is bank size measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. 
National bank regulation is measured using the total regulation score (TotalR) self-constructed based on World Bank surveys and twelve subcategory regulations scores, including (1) entry into 
banking (EntryR); (2) ownership (OwnershipR); (3) capital requirement (CapitalR); (4) activities restrictions (ActivitiesR); (5) external auditing requirements (ExAuditR); (6) internal 
management/organizational requirements (ManagementR); (7) liquidity and risk diversification (LiquidityR); (8) depositor (saving) protection schemes (DepositR); (9) asset classification 
provisioning and write-offs (ProvisionR); (10) accounting/ information disclosure (DisclosureR); (11) discipline problem and institutions’ exit (ExitR); and (12) supervision 
(SupervisionR).Other country-level variables includenet export (NExport), the value of export minus import as a share of GDP; Inflation, Change in the national consumer price index; GDP 
Growth (GDPG), annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita at market prices based on constant prices of 2000 U.S. dollars; GDP per capital (GDPPC), gross domestic product divided by 
midyear population; Term of Trade Shocks (TTS), Standard deviation of the value of import divided by the value of export in constant prices of 2000 U.S. dollars; Real Interest Rate (RIR), The 
deposit interest rate minus Inflation measured by the GDP deflator; Interest Rate Differential (IRD), Difference between the rate interest rate in a country and the average real interest of 
Germany, US and Japan; M2 to Foreign Exchange Reserves (M2R), The sum of currency outside banks, demand deposits other than those of the central government, and the time, savings, and 
foreign currency deposits of resident sectors other than the central government; Concentration, Herfindahl-Hirschmann index of bank assets within a country; Stock Market Capitalization to 
GDP (SMC), Value of listed shares to GDP; Foreign Banks to Total Banks (FB), Percentage of the number of foreign owned banks to the number of the total banks in an Economy; Currency or 
Debt Crises (Crisis), dummy variable that equals 1 if in a country-year there is a currency crisis, otherwise 0;  and IMF Assistant Program (IMFassis) Dummy variable that equals to 1 if in a 
country-year there is an IMF program is running, otherwise 0. 
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Table 5 
Correlation Analyses. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) 
(1) Total Risk 1.00                        
(2) Credit Rating 0.07b 1.00                       
(3) Inverted z score 0.14c -0.13c 1.00                      
(4) TotalR 0.10c 0.08b -0.04a 1.00                     
(5) NExport -0.09b -0.36c -0.03a -0.06b 1.00                    
(6) Inflation 0.06b 0.34c 0.00a 0.07b -0.04a 1.00                   
(7) GDPG 0.00a 0.10c 0.00a -0.16c 0.01a -0.03a 1.00                  
(8) TTS 0.18c 0.00a -0.04a -0.03a 0.42c 0.16c -0.08b 1.00                 
(9) RIR 0.00a 0.11c -0.01a 0.12c -0.36c -0.12c -0.10c -0.17c 1.00                
(10) IRD -0.03a 0.17c -0.01a 0.17c -0.22c -0.06b -0.03a 0.03a 0.76c 1.00               
(11) GDPPC -0.06b -0.51c -0.04a 0.02a 0.58c -0.13c -0.18c 0.25c -0.26c -0.16c 1.00              
(12) M2R -0.05b -0.29c -0.08b -0.09b 0.11c -0.08b -0.03a -0.19c -0.05b -0.10c 0.13c 1.00             
(13) Concentration 0.12c -0.17c 0.02a -0.08b 0.27c -0.23c 0.04a 0.21c -0.10c -0.06b 0.12c 0.04a 1.00            
(14) SMC -0.13c -0.37c -0.07b 0.04a 0.19c -0.13c -0.06b -0.03a -0.11c -0.15c 0.40c 0.41c 0.18c 1.00           
(15) FB 0.04a 0.19c 0.07b 0.11c -0.57c -0.04a -0.15c -0.22c 0.34c 0.31c -0.01a -0.24c 0.00a -0.04  1.00          
(16) Crisis 0.12c 0.12c 0.07b -0.21c -0.02a 0.14c -0.13c 0.17c 0.16c 0.16c 0.13c -0.16c -0.20c -0.06  0.08b 1.00         
(17) IMFassis 0.01a 0.13c -0.01a 0.03a -0.21c -0.03a -0.06b -0.05b 0.12c 0.06b -0.13c -0.10c 0.00a -0.14  0.21c -0.08b 1.00        
(18) Government -0.13c 0.01a -0.05b 0.01a -0.10c 0.16c 0.14c -0.20c 0.04a 0.01a -0.08b 0.22c -0.27c 0.03  -0.09b -0.04a -0.06b 1.00       
(19) Industrial -0.07b 0.11c -0.01a -0.08b -0.06b -0.04a 0.04a -0.02a 0.04a 0.08b -0.06b 0.02a -0.03a 0.02  0.04a 0.06b -0.06b -0.15c 1.00      
(20) Financial -0.01a -0.07b -0.03a 0.04a -0.22c -0.14c -0.10c -0.07b 0.07b 0.08b -0.03a -0.08b 0.04a 0.02  0.27c -0.07b 0.14c -0.42c -0.22c 1.00     
(21) Family -0.04a 0.08b -0.00a -0.01a -0.06b 0.03a -0.01a -0.01a -0.06b -0.02a -0.04a -0.07b -0.02a 0.14  -0.06b 0.09b -0.04a -0.09b -0.05b 0.06b 1.00    
(22) Foreign 0.03a -0.01a 0.03a 0.13c -0.15c -0.16c -0.11c -0.08b 0.08b 0.10c 0.05b -0.13c 0.04a -0.03  0.32c -0.10c 0.09b -0.31c 0.13c 0.61c 0.07b 1.00   
(23) Shareholding -0.14c 0.05b -0.06b 0.09b -0.28c 0.09b -0.06b -0.18c 0.09b 0.12c -0.04a 0.02a -0.28c 0.07  0.29c 0.02a 0.07b 0.40c 0.11c 0.41c 0.08b 0.39c 1.00  
(24) Lnta 0.07b -0.35c -0.05b -0.37c 0.09b -0.18c 0.26c -0.23c -0.06b -0.19c -0.02a 0.27c 0.13c 0.04  -0.28c -0.06b -0.09b 0.20c 0.04a -0.07b -0.03a -0.18c -0.11c 
Notes: Table 5 reports correlation analyses for variables used in regression analyses. Total risk is a self-constructed variable based on the CAMELS indicators. Credit rating is self-constructed 
credit rating score based on S&PLT, MLTD, and FLT credit ratings. Insolvency risk is the inverted bank-level z score calculated as σROA/(ROA+EAR). Total regulation score (TotalR) is self-
constructed based on World Bank surveys. Large owner dummies (government, industrial, financial, family and foreign) take the value of 1 if the large owner is a government, an industrial 
company, a financial company, family or foreigner, respectively, and 0 otherwise. Shareholding is the shareholding by the large owner. Lnta is the natural logarithm of total assets as a measure 
of bank size. Net export (NExport) is the value of export minus import as a share of GDP. Inflation is the change in the national consumer price index. GDP Growth (GDPG) is the annual 
percentage growth rate of GDP per capita at market prices based on constant prices of 2000 U.S. dollars. GDP per capital (GDPPC) is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. 
Term of Trade Shocks (TTS) is the standard deviation of the value of import divided by the value of export in constant prices of 2000 U.S. dollars. Real Interest Rate (RIR) is the deposit interest 
rate minus Inflation measured by the GDP deflator. Interest Rate Differential (IRD) is the difference between the rate interest rate in a country and the average real interest of Germany, US and 
Japan. M2 to Foreign Exchange Reserves (M2R) is the sum of currency outside banks, demand deposits other than those of the central government, and the time, savings, and foreign currency 
deposits of resident sectors other than the central government. Concentration is the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index of bank assets within a country. Stock Market Capitalization to GDP (SMC) is 
the value of listed shares to GDP. Foreign Banks to Total Banks (FB) is the percentage of the number of foreign owned banks to the number of the total banks in an Economy. Currency or Debt 
Crises (Crisis) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if in a country-year there is a currency crisis, otherwise 0. And IMF Assistant Program (IMFassis) is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if in a 
country-year there is an IMF program is running, otherwise 0. a, b, and c denote significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Regulation, Identity of Large Owner and Bank Risk. 
VARIABLES Total Risk Credit Rating Inverted z Score 
Constant 1.356*** -1.462*** 1.408** 0.906*** 1.736*** 1.817** -0.073*** -0.487*** -0.949*** 
 (8.50) (-3.18) (2.08) (2.92) (3.33) (2.35) (-33.41) (-59.48) (-51.36) 
Lagged DV 0.479*** 0.461*** 0.461*** 0.974*** 0.965*** 0.960*** 0.092*** 0.092*** 0.104*** 
 (184.79) (109.76) (106.77) (114.11) (81.47) (62.11) (1,762.17
) 
(1,111.43
) 
(801.59) 
TotalR -0.030*** -0.023*** -0.020*** -0.005** -0.005** -0.006 -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.000 
 (-22.78) (-8.10) (-3.53) (-2.46) (-2.19) (-0.66) (-82.81) (-85.72) (-0.94) 
Government  -2.430*** 0.069  -0.519* -1.424  -0.747*** -2.516*** 
  (-6.20) (0.04)  (-1.91) (-1.49)  (-42.51) (-26.84) 
TotalR×Government   -0.037   0.025*   0.023*** 
   (-1.50)   (1.92)   (20.92) 
Industrial  -4.267*** -12.050***  -0.431 -2.831**  -0.602*** -2.012*** 
  (-13.25) (-6.98)  (-1.55) (-2.00)  (-59.87) (-22.68) 
TotalR×Industrial   0.116***   0.055***   0.022*** 
   (5.00)   (3.25)   (21.31) 
Financial  1.943*** -2.668  -0.638** -3.841***  -0.408*** -2.346*** 
  (5.97) (-1.57)  (-2.14) (-3.17)  (-27.56) (-32.84) 
TotalR×Financial   0.065***   0.061***   0.025*** 
   (2.67)   (3.69)   (28.28) 
Family  -4.407*** -14.377***  1.552*** 16.471***  -0.462*** -5.439*** 
  (-4.33) (-6.91)  (5.67) (5.50)  (-13.01) (-22.64) 
TotalR×Family   0.153***   -0.195***   0.052*** 
   (7.44)   (-5.22)   (22.34) 
Foreign  -1.633*** -0.074***  -0.393** -0.024**  -0.270*** -0.022 
  (-5.28) (-3.38)  (-2.04) (-2.04)  (-45.19) (-0.35) 
TotalR×Foreign   3.452**   1.251   -0.003*** 
   (2.31)   (1.48)   (-3.64) 
Shareholding  0.005 0.026  0.001 0.020***  0.003*** 0.028*** 
  (1.60) (1.49)  (0.34) (2.68)  (15.20) (31.95) 
TotalR× Shareholding   -0.000   -0.000***   -0.000*** 
   (-1.04)   (-4.74)   (-34.84) 
Lnta -0.238*** 0.003 0.028 -0.197*** -0.306*** -0.238** 0.003*** 0.028*** 0.030*** 
 (-38.94) (0.14) (1.08) (-6.56) (-4.60) (-2.39) (12.95) (40.60) (24.35) 
Inflation 0.043*** 0.067*** 0.068*** 0.003** 0.008* 0.002 -0.003*** -0.000*** 0.001*** 
 (31.85) (14.85) (13.74) (2.18) (1.91) (0.51) (-280.61) (-11.84) (22.33) 
RIR 0.046*** 0.062*** 0.061*** 0.008*** 0.030*** 0.004 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** 
 (12.81) (15.67) (14.29) (3.67) (5.44) (0.92) (-267.24) (-136.31) (-99.48) 
IRD -0.125*** -0.099*** -0.104*** -0.032*** -0.016 -0.028*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.033*** 
 (-26.91) (-10.95) (-10.95) (-9.41) (-1.64) (-3.32) (721.39) (335.26) (147.29) 
Crisis 1.052*** 0.847*** 0.915*** 0.255*** -0.052 -0.003 0.076*** 0.035*** 0.070*** 
 (17.13) (5.66) (4.69) (5.77) (-0.46) (-0.03) (158.02) (52.06) (27.75) 
M2R 0.049*** 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.017 0.034* 0.042** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.003*** 
 (5.08) (3.64) (3.48) (1.37) (1.91) (2.17) (-244.15) (-129.91) (-9.92) 
Concentration 0.021*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.004*** 0.001 -0.001 -0.001*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (18.49) (12.75) (13.24) (7.20) (0.85) (-0.52) (-304.25) (-259.29) (-144.02) 
SMC -0.001** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.005*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (-2.35) (-4.41) (-2.97) (-6.83) (-6.69) (-8.27) (107.27) (66.51) (63.02) 
FB 0.008*** -0.010** -0.015*** 0.000 0.004** 0.007** -0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 
 (9.74) (-2.55) (-3.12) (0.60) (2.30) (2.43) (-137.06) (36.12) (45.71) 
NExport 0.006*** -0.012* -0.006 0.006*** 0.010*** 0.012*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (3.74) (-1.82) (-0.90) (5.53) (3.50) (3.99) (-99.34) (-66.15) (-18.94) 
TTS -0.001*** 0.002* 0.002* -0.000 0.000 -0.002*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 
 (-4.09) (1.72) (1.92) (-1.03) (0.58) (-3.22) (187.46) (52.19) (61.27) 
GDPG 0.054*** 0.058*** 0.054*** -0.013*** 0.002 0.001 -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.008*** 
 (9.83) (10.33) (8.88) (-4.44) (0.32) (0.22) (-603.73) (-243.57) (-105.78) 
GDPPC -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-21.86) (-0.55) (-0.69) (-5.28) (-5.72) (-3.75) (-41.10) (-61.11) (-46.31) 
IMFassis 0.038 -0.204*** -0.195*** -0.064** -0.114*** -0.068* 0.017*** 0.011*** 0.005*** 
 (1.26) (-3.97) (-3.96) (-2.55) (-2.59) (-1.69) (212.11) (53.86) (16.32) 
  
40 
 
Observations 2,499 2,499 2,499 878 770 770 2,856 2,856 2,856 
Number of id 357 357 357 113 113 113 357 357 357 
AB test AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.086 0.085 0.085 
AB test AR(2) 0.470 0.454 0.469 0.769 0.717 0.841 0.435 0.422 0.379 
Sargan test 0.985 0.534 0.982 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.133 0.293 0.002 
 
Notes: Total risk is a self-constructed variable based on the CAMELS indicators. Credit rating is self-constructed credit 
rating score based on S&PLT, MLTD, and FLT credit ratings. Insolvency risk is the inverted bank-level z score calculated as 
σROA/(ROA+EAR). Total regulation score (TotalR) is self-constructed based on World Bank surveys. Large owner 
dummies (government, industrial, financial, family and foreign) take the value of 1 if the large owner is a government, an 
industrial company, a financial company, family or foreigner, respectively, and 0 otherwise. Shareholding is the 
shareholding by the large owner. Lnta is the natural logarithm of total assets as a measure of bank size. Net export (NExport) 
is the value of export minus import as a share of GDP. Inflation is the change in the national consumer price index. GDP 
Growth (GDPG) is the annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita at market prices based on constant prices of 2000 
U.S. dollars. GDP per capital (GDPPC) is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. Term of Trade Shocks 
(TTS) is the standard deviation of the value of import divided by the value of export in constant prices of 2000 U.S. dollars. 
Real Interest Rate (RIR) is the deposit interest rate minus Inflation measured by the GDP deflator. Interest Rate Differentia l 
(IRD) is the difference between the rate interest rate in a country and the average real interest of Germany, US and Japan. 
M2 to Foreign Exchange Reserves (M2R) is the sum of currency outside banks, demand deposits other than those of the 
central government, and the time, savings, and foreign currency deposits of resident sectors other than the central 
government. Concentration is the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index of bank assets within a country. Stock Market Capitalization 
to GDP (SMC) is the value of listed shares to GDP. Foreign Banks to Total Banks (FB) is the percentage of the number of 
foreign owned banks to the number of the total banks in an Economy. Currency or Debt Crises (Crisis) is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if in a country-year there is a currency crisis, otherwise 0. And IMF Assistant Program (IMFassis) is a dummy 
variable that equals to 1 if in a country-year there is an IMF program is running, otherwise 0. The z-statistics are reported in 
parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
Table 7 
A Summary of Findings for Subcategory Regulations on Bank Risk. 
 
 Total Risk Credit Rating Risk Inverted z Score 
EntryR +*** +** -*** 
OwnershipR -*** +*** -*** 
CapitalR -*** -** -*** 
ActivitiesR -*** -*** -*** 
ExAuditR -*** -** -*** 
ManagementR +*** -*** -*** 
LiquidityR -***  +*** 
DepositR -*** -* -*** 
ProvisionR +*** -** +*** 
DisclosureR  -*** -*** 
ExitR +*** +*** +*** 
SupervisionR -*** -*** +*** 
 
Notes: Total risk is a self-constructed variable based on the CAMELS indicators. Credit rating is self-
constructed credit rating score based on S&PLT, MLTD, and FLT credit ratings. Insolvency risk is the inverted 
bank-level z score calculated as σROA/(ROA+EAR). The twelve subcategory regulations scores include (1) 
entry into banking (EntryR); (2) ownership (OwnershipR); (3) capital requirement (CapitalR); (4) activities 
restrictions (ActivitiesR); (5) external auditing requirements (ExAuditR); (6) internal 
management/organizational requirements (ManagementR); (7) liquidity and risk diversification (LiquidityR); 
(8) depositor (saving) protection schemes (DepositR); (9) asset classification provisioning and write-offs 
(ProvisionR); (10) accounting/ information disclosure (DisclosureR); (11) discipline problem and institutions’ 
exit (ExitR); and (12) supervision (SupervisionR). Details for the regression results reported in Table 7 can be 
found in Table A.4a-c.  
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Table 8 
Regulation, Large Owner and Capital Adequacy of Banks. 
VARIABLES Total Equity/Total Assets Total Capital Ratio 
Constant 11.333*** 11.249*** 16.324*** 15.028*** 21.627*** 20.562*** 25.782*** 27.639*** 
 (31.89) (34.93) (50.04) (36.31) (126.68) (120.97) (43.98) (50.09) 
Lagged DV 0.657*** 0.650*** 0.604*** 0.624*** 0.544*** 0.533*** 0.487*** 0.458*** 
 (203.53) (276.62) (429.71) (178.73) (298.13) (315.65) (205.47) (162.11) 
TotalR 0.017***  0.018***  -0.039***  -0.025***  
 (7.88)  (9.86)  (-32.05)  (-14.46)  
CapitalR  0.232***  0.219***  -0.297***  -0.240*** 
  (25.53)  (15.50)  (-37.71)  (-25.71) 
Government   11.803*** 9.185***   14.309*** 15.715*** 
   (38.84) (24.32)   (19.40) (24.07) 
Industrial   5.038*** 8.457***   24.315*** 24.033*** 
   (16.55) (31.52)   (31.20) (33.69) 
Financial   5.544*** 4.501***   12.975*** 14.432*** 
   (22.04) (10.52)   (14.08) (16.98) 
Family   15.557*** 7.057***   4.972*** 1.686 
   (28.88) (8.59)   (4.47) (1.50) 
Foreign   1.586*** 3.019***   0.069 -1.048** 
   (11.52) (8.43)   (0.16) (-2.39) 
Shareholding   -0.062*** -0.067***   -0.147*** -0.168*** 
   (-25.23) (-20.77)   (-20.14) (-27.67) 
Lnta 2.858*** 2.714*** -0.927*** 2.492*** 1.509*** 1.642*** 0.907*** 1.161*** 
 (37.68) (42.26) (-41.27) (34.17) (39.25) (39.18) (19.25) (20.75) 
Inflation -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.069*** -0.024*** -0.017*** -0.014*** 0.014*** 0.008** 
 (-11.08) (-18.17) (-28.98) (-5.85) (-13.91) (-10.99) (7.02) (2.49) 
RIR -0.015*** -0.027*** -0.063*** -0.018*** 0.031*** 0.020*** -0.022*** -0.006* 
 (-4.00) (-7.82) (-31.54) (-3.77) (13.28) (9.67) (-7.75) (-1.93) 
IRD -0.080*** -0.041*** 0.035*** -0.049*** -0.094*** -0.064*** -0.020*** 0.017*** 
 (-17.56) (-8.54) (6.95) (-5.89) (-23.02) (-16.30) (-4.40) (2.75) 
Crisis 1.044*** 0.875*** 0.124*** 1.229*** -0.685*** -0.757*** 0.155*** 0.359*** 
 (14.51) (15.52) (2.85) (14.04) (-19.64) (-22.61) (3.49) (6.60) 
M2R 0.007 -0.002 -0.306*** -0.086*** -0.013 0.031*** -0.100*** 0.022 
 (0.76) (-0.16) (-30.01) (-6.02) (-0.94) (2.87) (-6.68) (1.59) 
Concentration 0.004*** -0.001 0.006*** 0.008*** -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.011*** -0.010*** 
 (3.70) (-0.79) (6.51) (5.83) (-47.47) (-66.56) (-13.97) (-11.57) 
SMC -0.001 -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.002*** 0.001** 0.001 0.002*** 
 (-1.09) (-5.39) (-7.94) (-4.35) (-6.28) (2.17) (0.79) (2.89) 
FB -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.024*** -0.015*** -0.048*** -0.046*** -0.025*** -0.034*** 
 (-8.43) (-8.21) (-15.87) (-7.09) (-84.71) (-60.60) (-16.11) (-18.12) 
NExport 0.062*** 0.055*** 0.082*** 0.055*** 0.047*** 0.060*** 0.034*** 0.077*** 
 (22.76) (18.50) (46.86) (14.74) (20.16) (27.55) (16.00) (26.78) 
TTS 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.025*** 
 (16.22) (12.78) (30.47) (14.69) (44.60) (54.89) (31.95) (42.77) 
GDPG 0.067*** 0.063*** 0.026*** 0.043*** 0.021*** -0.001 -0.044*** -0.060*** 
 (18.02) (14.22) (6.68) (10.65) (5.86) (-0.25) (-13.38) (-15.37) 
GDPPC -0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000** -0.000** 
 (-1.13) (0.96) (4.75) (2.50) (-6.16) (-10.99) (2.09) (-1.99) 
IMFassis 0.175*** 0.169*** 0.294*** 0.237*** 0.400*** 0.381*** 0.766*** 0.523*** 
 (5.51) (4.97) (11.82) (5.30) (20.78) (21.66) (53.43) (24.10) 
Observations 2,856 2,856 2,816 2,816 2,856 2,856 2,856 2,856 
Number of id 357 357 352 352 357 357 357 357 
AB test AR(1) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.029 0.030 0.033 0.035 
AB test AR(2) 0.593 0.581 0.606 0.577 0.447 0.451 0.451 0.464 
Sargan test  0.216 0.217 0.988 0.233 0.228 0.200 0.660 0.207 
Notes: Table 8 presents the effect of total regulation and subcategory regulation (CapitalR) on capital adequacy 
of banks. The subcategory regulation score (CapitalR) measures national regulation on capital requirement. The first proxy 
for capital adequacy of banks is total equity to total assets ratio. The second proxy is total capital ratio calculated as the ratio 
of tier 1&2 capital to total weighted assets. Other variables are defined the same as those in Table 6. The z-statistics are 
reported in parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
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 Table 9 
 Regulation, Large Owner and Asset Quality of Banks. 
VARIABLES Loan Loss Provision/Total Loans Impaired Loan Ratio 
Constant -0.055 -1.657*** -2.965*** -3.905*** 4.102*** 1.708*** -0.060 0.680 
 (-0.37) (-17.13) (-10.56) (-17.48) (17.03) (10.57) (-0.28) (1.55) 
Lagged DV 0.915*** 0.909*** 0.876*** 0.867*** 0.783*** 0.779*** 0.781*** 0.778*** 
 (722.43) (658.04) (497.39) (414.11) (336.76) (355.71) (623.69) (282.73) 
TotalR -0.014***  -0.008***  -0.025***  -0.018***  
 (-10.33)  (-5.66)  (-11.26)  (-15.06)  
ProvisionR  -0.027***  0.084***  -0.058***  0.004 
  (-6.04)  (21.92)  (-10.48)  (0.58) 
Government   -2.601*** -3.175***   -2.796*** 1.826*** 
   (-12.68) (-14.14)   (-10.60) (3.78) 
Industrial   -8.049*** -8.229***   -11.566*** -5.643*** 
   (-34.95) (-25.35)   (-38.40) (-7.02) 
Financial   1.499*** 1.373***   -1.468*** 3.395*** 
   (10.35) (8.20)   (-7.24) (6.60) 
Family   6.298*** 5.281***   12.793*** 5.502* 
   (6.27) (4.67)   (10.23) (1.95) 
Foreign   -3.656*** -3.916***   -0.201 -0.742** 
   (-32.48) (-41.17)   (-1.52) (-2.36) 
Shareholding   0.007*** 0.008***   0.021*** -0.020*** 
   (3.29) (3.15)   (7.23) (-4.88) 
Lnta 0.634*** 0.656*** 0.434*** 0.387*** 1.040*** 1.045*** 0.218*** 0.819*** 
 (15.55) (13.32) (15.09) (12.38) (12.79) (15.33) (5.10) (6.91) 
Inflation -0.014*** -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.013*** -0.017*** -0.013*** 
 (-11.86) (-12.13) (-17.32) (-25.77) (-20.70) (-12.19) (-17.89) (-7.23) 
RIR 0.101*** 0.100*** 0.107*** 0.102*** 0.045*** 0.049*** 0.085*** 0.055*** 
 (47.28) (40.40) (64.24) (59.04) (10.49) (11.33) (38.95) (12.85) 
IRD -0.133*** -0.106*** -0.124*** -0.144*** -0.150*** -0.102*** -0.169*** -0.121*** 
 (-35.85) (-25.32) (-41.42) (-44.15) (-25.53) (-16.61) (-54.00) (-16.65) 
Crisis -1.415*** -1.459*** -1.277*** -1.113*** -0.353*** -0.582*** 0.549*** -0.879*** 
 (-25.18) (-25.31) (-30.18) (-24.29) (-3.98) (-6.28) (17.51) (-7.76) 
M2R -0.067*** -0.081*** -0.051*** -0.052*** -0.213*** -0.236*** -0.177*** -0.250*** 
 (-12.51) (-12.65) (-9.44) (-8.12) (-14.96) (-18.81) (-20.37) (-10.38) 
Concentration -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.020*** -0.023*** -0.034*** -0.037*** -0.048*** -0.048*** 
 (-22.74) (-25.29) (-36.45) (-39.56) (-30.24) (-31.03) (-63.09) (-25.72) 
SMC -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.007*** 
 (-28.82) (-25.98) (-17.42) (-14.01) (-5.75) (-6.83) (-9.43) (-6.18) 
FB 0.022*** 0.024*** 0.032*** 0.035*** 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 
 (33.34) (39.37) (35.66) (36.73) (33.45) (29.20) (52.28) (21.07) 
NExport 0.079*** 0.084*** 0.070*** 0.067*** 0.126*** 0.131*** 0.109*** 0.143*** 
 (34.27) (38.88) (56.39) (35.64) (43.12) (37.70) (41.94) (26.99) 
TTS 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.001 0.001 0.006*** -0.001 
 (9.60) (9.53) (15.10) (13.61) (0.80) (1.43) (13.78) (-0.78) 
GDPG -0.064*** -0.063*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.132*** -0.126*** -0.058*** -0.101*** 
 (-23.54) (-23.17) (-8.73) (-9.12) (-35.80) (-29.77) (-31.33) (-19.57) 
GDPPC -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-19.06) (-13.18) (-47.06) (-47.68) (-10.22) (-10.76) (-59.23) (-10.68) 
IMFassis 0.266*** 0.176*** 0.109*** 0.138*** 0.504*** 0.358*** 0.427*** 0.363*** 
 (15.71) (10.14) (5.93) (9.30) (13.82) (13.06) (24.73) (10.85) 
Observations 2,499 2,499 2,816 2,816 2,499 2,499 2,816 2,816 
Number of id 357 357 352 352 357 357 352 352 
AB test AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AB test AR(2) 0.312 0.314 0.286 0.188 0.372 0.370 0.448 0.533 
Sargan test  0.437 0.359 0.404 0.138 0.447 0.367 0.880 0.260 
Notes: Table 9 presents the effect of total regulation and subcategory regulation (ProvisionR) on asset quality of 
banks. The subcategory regulation score (ProvisionR) measures national regulation on asset classification provisioning and 
write-offs. The first proxy for asset quality of banks is loan loss provision to total loans ratio. The second proxy is impaired 
loan ratio calculated as the ratio of impaired loans to total loans. Other variables are defined the same as those in Table 6. 
The z-statistics are reported in parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 10 
Regulation, Large Owner and Management Cost of Banks. 
VARIABLES Total Cost/Total Income Overhead Cost/Total Assets 
Constant 59.526*** 64.211*** 37.296*** 63.120*** 1.965*** 2.646*** 2.993*** 1.424*** 
 (35.62) (51.51) (13.62) (19.17) (19.55) (46.07) (12.97) (7.58) 
Lagged DV 0.215*** 0.214*** 0.195*** 0.161*** 0.603*** 0.553*** 0.543*** 0.587*** 
 (116.34) (113.42) (78.28) (54.86) (292.06) (261.07) (159.67) (217.00) 
TotalR 0.037**  0.156***  0.005***  -0.001  
 (2.20)  (8.30)  (6.80)  (-0.60)  
ManagementR  1.474***  -2.576***  0.061***  0.207*** 
  (2.86)  (-4.77)  (3.45)  (7.76) 
Government   -42.034*** -44.097***   -2.238*** -3.439*** 
   (-15.35) (-11.81)   (-6.14) (-17.51) 
Industrial   -23.270*** -35.553***   -0.986*** -2.075*** 
   (-11.71) (-15.26)   (-5.11) (-14.62) 
Financial   -33.408*** -68.207***   -5.635*** -5.458*** 
   (-11.94) (-19.03)   (-13.66) (-22.94) 
Family   -123.435*** -220.937***   -5.870*** -5.832*** 
   (-8.00) (-12.18)   (-6.42) (-9.66) 
Foreign   -3.533* 14.631***   1.942*** 1.243*** 
   (-1.73) (5.63)   (9.38) (9.44) 
Shareholding   0.128*** 0.248***   0.022*** 0.030*** 
   (5.37) (6.87)   (5.68) (15.78) 
Lnta -5.708*** -5.498*** -5.115*** -4.078*** 0.978*** 0.738*** 0.604*** 1.076*** 
 (-15.05) (-12.56) (-14.30) (-10.26) (47.73) (39.66) (22.89) (50.74) 
Inflation 0.155*** 0.110*** 0.235*** 0.209*** -0.006*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.018*** 
 (10.18) (7.41) (15.08) (9.62) (-11.66) (-27.74) (-10.37) (-20.37) 
RIR 0.062*** 0.070*** 0.005 0.127*** 0.013*** -0.000 -0.009*** 0.004*** 
 (4.25) (4.75) (0.30) (6.96) (17.24) (-0.24) (-6.16) (3.57) 
IRD 0.271*** 0.219*** 0.643*** 0.445*** 0.033*** 0.064*** 0.077*** 0.032*** 
 (11.52) (10.81) (19.01) (12.11) (24.20) (36.99) (19.78) (10.96) 
Crisis 7.577*** 5.753*** 14.105*** 11.733*** -0.411*** -0.671*** -0.448*** -0.586*** 
 (11.94) (10.95) (16.47) (12.07) (-14.29) (-21.15) (-9.45) (-19.20) 
M2R -1.852*** -1.696*** -0.533*** -1.212*** -0.024*** -0.040*** 0.041*** -0.025*** 
 (-37.47) (-23.14) (-6.72) (-13.55) (-5.83) (-10.37) (7.78) (-5.38) 
Concentration -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.019*** -0.065*** -0.008*** -0.002*** -0.007*** -0.005*** 
 (-2.80) (-3.17) (-4.66) (-10.80) (-35.25) (-12.72) (-17.40) (-15.99) 
SMC -0.046*** -0.042*** 0.058*** 0.023*** -0.008*** -0.005*** -0.008*** -0.003*** 
 (-12.88) (-12.52) (12.88) (3.98) (-31.38) (-31.35) (-26.13) (-13.71) 
FB 0.051*** 0.019*** -0.159*** 0.120*** -0.003*** -0.001** -0.006*** 0.001*** 
 (8.04) (3.03) (-11.24) (9.32) (-4.74) (-2.50) (-3.87) (2.92) 
NExport -0.557*** -0.581*** -0.422*** -0.203*** -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.031*** -0.036*** 
 (-42.94) (-42.62) (-39.00) (-14.36) (-20.33) (-22.79) (-22.05) (-37.27) 
TTS 0.063*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.023*** 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (20.39) (18.63) (16.40) (5.06) (3.52) (16.76) (7.12) (6.79) 
GDPG -0.157*** -0.172*** 0.090*** 0.184*** 0.021*** 0.012*** -0.002 0.017*** 
 (-10.35) (-10.32) (4.32) (9.86) (18.56) (12.00) (-1.14) (19.33) 
GDPPC 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** 
 (9.59) (8.38) (-5.03) (-4.37) (-18.98) (-22.73) (-0.68) (-20.01) 
IMFassis 1.739*** 1.609*** 1.013*** -0.602*** 0.142*** 0.119*** 0.201*** 0.081*** 
 (18.88) (15.25) (4.91) (-3.34) (19.52) (9.91) (12.68) (6.61) 
Observations 2,499 2,499 2,856 2,499 2,856 2,499 2,499 2,856 
Number of id 357 357 357 357 357 357 357 357 
AB test AR(1) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.011 0.010 0.008 
AB test AR(2) 0.171 0.172 0.166 0.214 0.066 0.083 0.090 0.063 
Sargan test  0.664 0.680 0.679 0.304 0.208 0.260 0.129 0.218 
Notes: Table 10 presents the effect of total regulation and subcategory regulation (ManagementR) on management cost of 
banks. The subcategory regulation score (ManagementR) measures national regulation on internal 
management/organizational requirements. The first proxy for management cost of banks is total cost to total income ratio. 
The second proxy is overhead cost to total assets ratio. Other variables are defined the same as those in Table 6. The z-
statistics are reported in parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 11 
Regulation, Large Owner and Profitability of Banks. 
VARIABLES ROA ROE 
Constant 4.602*** 2.195*** 3.855*** 2.118*** 7.516*** -6.626*** -4.974*** 2.930*** 
 (34.32) (17.20) (18.69) (13.51) (10.13) (-11.62) (-3.06) (3.01) 
Lagged DV 0.073*** 0.066*** 0.097*** 0.095*** 0.309*** 0.311*** 0.295*** 0.283*** 
 (46.16) (34.44) (65.65) (71.81) (96.44) (88.04) (54.94) (70.06) 
TotalR -0.016***  -0.005***  -0.085***  -0.006  
 (-10.92)  (-3.55)  (-13.38)  (-0.49)  
ActivitiesR  0.132***  0.068***  0.141***  0.073** 
  (26.81)  (12.58)  (5.47)  (2.28) 
Government   3.291*** 2.109***   3.185** 7.516*** 
   (15.56) (9.37)   (2.32) (7.46) 
Industrial   0.771*** -0.157   0.961 6.323*** 
   (5.93) (-1.21)   (0.84) (7.72) 
Financial   3.350*** 2.323***   17.842*** 19.354*** 
   (19.43) (14.31)   (11.94) (20.77) 
Family   7.740*** 6.768***   59.061*** 72.201*** 
   (19.47) (16.50)   (7.55) (14.37) 
Foreign   1.369*** 1.168***   -9.973*** -7.879*** 
   (12.42) (15.30)   (-8.48) (-11.40) 
Shareholding   -0.041*** -0.028***   -0.011 -0.099*** 
   (-24.38) (-15.53)   (-0.90) (-8.47) 
Lnta 2.600*** 2.504*** 1.949*** 1.976*** 6.004*** 5.922*** 4.305*** 6.290*** 
 (72.19) (75.37) (47.84) (48.49) (19.36) (21.46) (11.04) (21.36) 
Inflation -0.001 0.000 0.004*** 0.001 0.010 0.019*** 0.089*** 0.041*** 
 (-0.94) (0.46) (4.11) (0.88) (1.55) (2.74) (6.79) (4.96) 
RIR 0.062*** 0.070*** 0.084*** 0.089*** 0.131*** 0.144*** 0.086*** 0.106*** 
 (30.88) (36.20) (49.30) (56.45) (15.21) (16.77) (5.82) (12.20) 
IRD 0.020*** -0.000 0.054*** 0.049*** 0.084*** 0.063*** -0.043* 0.073*** 
 (6.43) (-0.08) (16.68) (19.92) (6.07) (4.44) (-1.87) (5.24) 
Crisis 0.508*** 0.597*** 0.006 -0.040 -2.644*** -0.967*** -5.795*** -3.007*** 
 (13.79) (15.79) (0.14) (-0.83) (-8.73) (-3.66) (-14.58) (-11.54) 
M2R 0.175*** 0.153*** 0.187*** 0.186*** 0.407*** 0.268*** 0.546*** 0.346*** 
 (25.16) (23.61) (27.60) (22.08) (10.79) (6.21) (7.39) (6.61) 
Concentration -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.032*** -0.035*** -0.104*** -0.048*** 
 (-25.53) (-30.01) (-28.01) (-39.86) (-14.66) (-21.03) (-20.52) (-12.48) 
SMC -0.001** -0.002*** 0.001* -0.000 -0.015*** -0.020*** -0.017*** -0.028*** 
 (-2.06) (-5.03) (1.78) (-0.46) (-7.77) (-9.88) (-4.27) (-14.12) 
FB 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.007*** -0.017*** 0.002 0.059*** 0.029*** 
 (6.23) (10.30) (9.10) (9.84) (-5.63) (0.47) (4.98) (5.86) 
NExport 0.068*** 0.079*** 0.088*** 0.095*** 0.061*** 0.079*** -0.163*** -0.045*** 
 (47.65) (42.78) (44.01) (63.48) (7.98) (8.43) (-12.84) (-4.04) 
TTS -0.003*** -0.002*** 0.014*** 0.013*** -0.000 0.001 0.047*** 0.025*** 
 (-9.72) (-7.39) (45.86) (40.77) (-0.23) (0.52) (19.82) (14.12) 
GDPG 0.056*** 0.054*** 0.078*** 0.072*** 0.178*** 0.173*** 0.013 0.132*** 
 (27.25) (27.29) (42.87) (41.98) (14.50) (13.48) (0.63) (11.06) 
GDPPC -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000* -0.000** 
 (-16.46) (-16.23) (-32.47) (-32.92) (-4.44) (-1.59) (-1.79) (-2.16) 
IMFassis -0.035** -0.065*** -0.124*** -0.170*** 1.133*** 1.347*** 1.272*** 1.465*** 
 (-2.42) (-4.62) (-10.21) (-11.51) (10.82) (14.01) (9.74) (18.10) 
Observations 2,499 2,499 2,856 2,856 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,856 
Number of id 357 357 357 357 357 357 357 357 
AB test AR(1) 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AB test AR(2) 0.608 0.554 0.762 0.770 0.981 0.993 0.921 0.809 
Sargan test 0.446 0.306 0.206 0.103 0.855 0.737 0.347 0.438 
Notes: Table 11 presents the effect of total regulation and subcategory regulation (ActivitiesR) on profitability of banks. 
Total regulation score (TotalR) is self-constructed based on World Bank surveys. The subcategory regulation score 
(ActivitiesR) measures national regulation on activities restrictions. Profitability of banks is proxied by ROA and ROE, 
respectively. Other variables are defined the same as those in Table 6. The z-statistics are reported in parentheses.  ***, **, 
and * indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
  
45 
 
Table 12 
Regulation, Large Owner and Liquidity of Banks. 
VARIABLES Liquid Assets/Total Assets Liquid Assets/Short-term Funds Total Loans/Deposits 
Constant -8.572*** -0.621 3.827*** 4.620*** 39.025*** 35.164*** 45.273*** 50.837*** 24.536*** 14.853*** 30.686*** 15.818*** 
 (-2.73) (-0.66) (2.61) (3.58) (25.58) (30.81) (11.96) (14.23) (24.33) (21.30) (21.67) (10.41) 
Lagged DV 0.593*** 0.617*** 0.594*** 0.604*** 0.377*** 0.380*** 0.343*** 0.346*** 0.711*** 0.710*** 0.681*** 0.676*** 
 (28.21) (80.98) (64.29) (60.01) (322.30) (322.14) (165.53) (175.04) (227.01) (222.28) (151.40) (116.20) 
TotalR 0.043  0.037***  0.065***  0.091***  -0.078***  -0.101***  
 (1.15)  (3.09)  (4.86)  (5.65)  (-9.04)  (-10.91)  
LiquidityR  0.414***  0.258***  0.532***  0.323***  -0.224***  -0.426*** 
  (4.90)  (2.59)  (7.73)  (2.92)  (-5.98)  (-6.22) 
Government   0.246 -1.481   -54.961*** -56.463***   11.494*** 9.625*** 
   (0.16) (-0.97)   (-18.68) (-18.92)   (9.95) (6.67) 
Industrial   7.817*** 6.830***   -41.318*** -35.011***   -1.551 1.266 
   (5.80) (7.17)   (-18.66) (-18.92)   (-1.63) (0.99) 
Financial   -8.929*** -9.192***   -65.558*** -66.400***   9.262*** 11.130*** 
   (-5.97) (-6.24)   (-20.22) (-23.47)   (9.97) (7.86) 
Family   7.104* 3.194   -72.406*** -140.958***   21.644*** 18.030*** 
   (1.66) (0.80)   (-10.40) (-18.65)   (5.51) (6.10) 
Foreign   5.117*** 3.322***   -30.996*** -27.554***   0.515 1.202* 
   (4.80) (3.44)   (-14.44) (-14.08)   (0.95) (1.93) 
Shareholding   0.016 0.024*   0.898*** 0.915***   0.013 0.005 
   (1.17) (1.83)   (33.99) (33.87)   (1.17) (0.35) 
Lnta 4.722*** 5.894*** 5.441*** 5.816*** 7.646*** 9.659*** 7.103*** 7.271*** -3.901*** -3.848*** -4.572*** -3.973*** 
 (4.38) (18.73) (14.85) (14.69) (21.63) (50.52) (16.90) (19.26) (-14.91) (-19.43) (-22.17) (-16.30) 
Inflation 0.004 -0.025** -0.050** -0.066*** -0.147*** -0.223*** -0.813*** -0.772*** 0.107*** 0.146*** 0.034*** 0.053*** 
 (0.08) (-2.51) (-2.22) (-3.32) (-13.63) (-28.24) (-24.59) (-24.51) (10.56) (22.76) (3.30) (4.36) 
RIR 0.066 -0.059*** -0.036 -0.060*** -0.235*** -0.344*** -0.311*** -0.324*** 0.082*** 0.140*** 0.123*** -0.004 
 (1.36) (-4.19) (-1.50) (-2.66) (-15.24) (-20.95) (-12.32) (-13.53) (8.86) (16.12) (10.00) (-0.30) 
IRD -0.240 0.549*** 0.411*** 0.459*** -0.736*** 0.536*** -0.078** -0.081* -0.256*** -0.220*** -0.296*** -0.276*** 
 (-1.45) (20.55) (12.40) (11.18) (-16.71) (32.42) (-2.09) (-1.94) (-10.91) (-12.19) (-13.91) (-9.10) 
Crisis 1.505 -0.348 0.513 0.436 -2.846*** -1.974*** -4.513*** -5.674*** -2.383*** -0.818*** -2.903*** -1.609*** 
 (1.20) (-1.48) (0.86) (0.84) (-5.61) (-6.41) (-10.54) (-12.55) (-9.62) (-6.76) (-11.68) (-5.87) 
M2R -0.269 -1.306*** -0.817*** -0.986*** -2.808*** -2.183*** -1.642*** -1.215*** -0.551*** 0.005 -0.193*** -0.659*** 
 (-1.14) (-21.61) (-8.90) (-10.60) (-41.71) (-64.63) (-20.66) (-13.72) (-11.17) (0.17) (-4.40) (-10.46) 
Concentration 0.013 -0.045*** 0.001 0.002 -0.195*** -0.203*** -0.029*** -0.009 0.008*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.025*** 
 (0.79) (-12.09) (0.11) (0.25) (-37.28) (-62.91) (-3.80) (-1.11) (3.57) (7.15) (4.46) (6.25) 
SMC 0.034** 0.020*** 0.031*** 0.021*** 0.053*** 0.082*** 0.027*** 0.026*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.021*** -0.020*** 
 (2.25) (10.38) (4.59) (2.90) (19.67) (44.64) (4.72) (3.98) (-7.20) (-6.32) (-8.05) (-5.90) 
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FB -0.119*** 0.008* -0.005 -0.003 -0.096*** -0.080*** -0.437*** -0.477*** -0.026*** -0.002 -0.063*** -0.136*** 
 (-2.73) (1.74) (-0.30) (-0.19) (-10.86) (-13.23) (-24.35) (-21.60) (-9.18) (-0.58) (-11.16) (-13.61) 
NExport -0.004 -0.059*** 0.025 0.013 -0.135*** -0.073*** -0.356*** -0.391*** -0.030*** -0.043*** -0.061*** -0.103*** 
 (-0.09) (-7.66) (1.26) (0.63) (-12.16) (-8.82) (-26.53) (-23.69) (-4.89) (-8.31) (-4.76) (-8.94) 
TTS -0.025*** -0.001 -0.018*** -0.023*** 0.079*** 0.082*** 0.055*** 0.072*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.004 0.002 
 (-2.63) (-0.60) (-3.76) (-5.08) (23.71) (26.93) (7.91) (14.79) (4.70) (12.06) (1.42) (0.81) 
GDPG 0.093 -0.092*** -0.184*** -0.186*** -0.758*** -0.825*** -0.786*** -0.727*** 0.090*** 0.062*** 0.037** 0.010 
 (1.47) (-5.40) (-5.95) (-6.75) (-40.41) (-39.79) (-28.77) (-29.86) (7.11) (4.72) (2.18) (0.57) 
GDPPC 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 0.000 0.000*** 
 (0.52) (0.79) (0.06) (0.83) (1.81) (-3.67) (9.22) (10.52) (-4.97) (-1.45) (0.82) (4.10) 
IMFassis 0.969** 0.960*** 0.914*** 0.752*** 2.205*** 1.377*** -0.307 -0.620*** -0.119 0.042 0.454*** 0.977*** 
 (2.55) (7.79) (5.16) (4.70) (14.59) (10.66) (-1.62) (-3.18) (-0.83) (0.39) (4.01) (6.49) 
Observations 1,785 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,856 2,856 2,816 2,816 2,856 2,856 2,816 2,816 
Number of id 357 357 357 357 357 357 357 357 357 357 357 357 
AB test AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AB test AR(2) 0.101 0.050 0.059 0.054 0.127 0.128 0.141 0.142 0.540 0.495 0.539 0.531 
Sargan test 0.277 0.945 0.405 0.376 0.185 0.313 0.185 0.118 0.508 0.619 0.635 0.797 
Notes: Table 12 presents the effect of total regulation and subcategory regulation (LiquidityR) on asset liquidity of banks. The subcategory regulation score (LiquidityR) measures national 
regulation on liquidity and risk diversification. The first proxy for asset liquidity of banks is liquid assets to total assets ratio. The second proxy is liquid assets to short-term funds ratio. The last 
proxy is total loans to deposits ratio. The former two proxies are positive indicators for asset liquidity, but the last proxy is a negative indicator. Other variables are defined the same as those in 
Table 6. The z-statistics are reported in parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 13 
Regulation, Large Owner and Bank Sensitivity to Market Risk. 
VARIABLES Total Interest Expenses/Total Deposits Government Securities/Total Assets 
Constant 2.177*** 1.198*** 3.254*** 1.811*** 9.417*** 10.980*** 15.285*** 12.305*** 
 (19.55) (13.33) (21.41) (11.47) (13.62) (22.79) (24.05) (15.89) 
Lagged DV 0.584*** 0.579*** 0.503*** 0.496*** 0.562*** 0.567*** 0.553*** 0.546*** 
 (238.21) (196.80) (185.12) (162.08) (124.74) (121.72) (142.83) (120.46) 
TotalR -0.022***  -0.023***  -0.013***  -0.018***  
 (-19.17)  (-22.57)  (-2.63)  (-4.87)  
SupervisionR  -0.106***  -0.107***  -0.024  -0.053** 
  (-31.25)  (-29.73)  (-1.59)  (-2.17) 
Government   -0.925*** -2.148***   7.513*** 4.945*** 
   (-8.05) (-12.45)   (13.84) (9.05) 
Industrial   -0.769*** -1.204***   0.419 -4.799*** 
   (-8.18) (-9.54)   (1.14) (-13.34) 
Financial   -2.509*** -3.880***   8.303*** -0.302 
   (-23.89) (-21.68)   (14.65) (-0.40) 
Family   4.069*** 3.534***   12.071*** 7.460*** 
   (11.07) (8.07)   (11.34) (5.19) 
Foreign   -1.219*** -1.283***   -2.067*** 4.650*** 
   (-12.41) (-10.54)   (-5.50) (6.48) 
Shareholding   0.040*** 0.049***   -0.099*** -0.072*** 
   (34.96) (28.03)   (-21.09) (-19.35) 
Lnta -1.358*** -1.463*** -1.582*** -1.626*** -2.371*** -2.384*** -2.292*** -1.906*** 
 (-36.97) (-40.75) (-49.31) (-54.25) (-25.00) (-24.10) (-22.15) (-13.78) 
Inflation 0.068*** 0.066*** 0.039*** 0.038*** -0.064*** -0.067*** -0.061*** -0.053*** 
 (34.32) (43.08) (31.54) (26.37) (-17.26) (-19.71) (-13.68) (-9.94) 
RIR 0.057*** 0.059*** 0.066*** 0.064*** 0.068*** 0.075*** 0.021*** 0.066*** 
 (38.24) (48.39) (42.74) (36.90) (11.95) (12.37) (4.83) (8.97) 
IRD 0.033*** 0.015*** 0.040*** 0.021*** 0.100*** 0.095*** 0.181*** 0.198*** 
 (13.59) (5.49) (20.02) (10.25) (12.22) (14.09) (21.09) (17.27) 
Crisis -0.877*** -0.886*** -1.349*** -1.257*** -0.315** -0.447*** -0.502*** -0.284 
 (-20.77) (-22.92) (-30.19) (-24.68) (-2.43) (-3.88) (-3.97) (-1.60) 
M2R 0.090*** 0.098*** 0.028*** 0.023*** 0.456*** 0.433*** 0.217*** 0.433*** 
 (12.94) (18.07) (4.25) (4.49) (26.03) (20.18) (7.24) (12.59) 
Concentration 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.000 0.000 0.009*** 0.005*** -0.001 -0.021*** 
 (8.47) (11.54) (0.62) (0.91) (6.21) (3.59) (-0.80) (-7.03) 
SMC 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.015*** 
 (16.38) (16.81) (7.74) (6.59) (-9.38) (-7.38) (-7.45) (-9.66) 
FB -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.021*** -0.019*** -0.001 -0.008* 
 (-19.36) (-17.09) (-25.81) (-22.68) (-10.79) (-10.32) (-0.65) (-1.77) 
NExport -0.015*** -0.016*** 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.004 0.012*** 0.049*** 0.096*** 
 (-15.98) (-12.25) (5.72) (3.48) (1.07) (3.21) (10.16) (13.81) 
TTS 0.005*** 0.005*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.007*** -0.006*** 0.005*** -0.006*** 
 (18.38) (24.46) (-6.75) (-5.17) (-8.92) (-9.21) (6.16) (-5.25) 
GDPG -0.016*** -0.020*** -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.046*** -0.049*** -0.045*** -0.055*** 
 (-13.13) (-13.40) (-17.28) (-19.14) (-6.78) (-9.43) (-9.40) (-5.75) 
GDPPC 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** -0.000** -0.000*** 
 (26.96) (26.99) (23.32) (25.32) (3.16) (2.31) (-2.43) (-3.70) 
IMFassis 0.086*** 0.174*** -0.007 0.066*** -0.054* -0.107*** -0.123*** -0.297*** 
 (6.70) (12.32) (-0.57) (4.97) (-1.75) (-3.04) (-2.76) (-4.07) 
Observations 2,499 2,499 2,856 2,856 2,499 2,499 2,856 2,856 
Number of id 357 357 357 357 357 357 357 357 
AB test AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AB test AR(2) 0.529 0.521 0.486 0.475 0.698 0.693 0.882 0.909 
Sargan test 0.246 0.284 0.141 0.141 0.721 0.781 0.648 0.219 
Notes: Table 13 presents the effect of total regulation and subcategory regulation (SupervisionR) on bank sensitivity to 
market risk. The subcategory regulation score (SupervisionR) measures national regulation on supervision. Bank sensitivity 
to market risk is proxied by either the ratio of total interest expenses to total deposits or the ratio of government securities to 
total assets. Other variables are defined the same as those in Table 6. The z-statistics are reported in parentheses.  ***, **, 
and * indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
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Table 14 
Changes in Regulations between 2007 and 2008, Deregulation and Bank Risk. 
 
VARIABLES ΔTotal Risk ΔCredit Rating ΔInverted z Score 
Constant 3.387*** -0.281** -0.057*** -5.278*** 0.629*** 0.485*** 
 (69.30) (-2.26) (-3.80) (-14.38) (51.41) (16.85) 
ΔTotalR -0.291***  -0.051***  -0.013***  
 (-48.62)  (-17.26)  (-7.45)  
Deregulation  27.212***  0.898***  0.576*** 
  (48.62)  (11.45)  (6.32) 
ΔLnta -4.599*** -4.599*** -0.256 -0.256 0.324 0.324 
 (-4.34) (-4.34) (-0.68) (-0.68) (1.30) (1.30) 
ΔInflation -0.544*** -4.588*** 0.163*** 0.560***  0.037*** 
 (-7.57) (-404.87) (7.93) (9.46)  (4.22) 
ΔRIR -0.595*** -1.869*** 0.092*** 0.298*** 0.174*** 0.238*** 
 (-9.21) (-48.74) (36.89) (19.26) (103.04) (16.15) 
ΔIRD 0.442*** -3.399*** -0.101** 0.497*** -0.758*** -0.822*** 
 (3.00) (-15.04) (-2.31) (4.36) (-28.16) (-18.43) 
Crisis -1.742*** -1.936*** 0.084 -2.326*** 0.389*** 1.109*** 
 (-20.18) (-23.53) (0.92) (-17.37) (5.75) (20.44) 
ΔM2R 0.272* 2.637*** -0.243*** -1.120*** -0.229*** -0.400*** 
 (1.87) (27.16) (-4.43) (-10.75) (-12.26) (-10.19) 
ΔConcentration 1.567*** 6.859*** -0.048***  -0.436*** -0.413*** 
 (13.74) (1,318.62) (-3.01)  (-41.31) (-33.80) 
ΔSMC -0.165*** -0.846*** 0.016*** -0.072*** 0.065*** 0.073*** 
 (-8.14) (-134.74) (7.24) (-10.10) (53.51) (21.44) 
ΔFB -0.925*** -1.934*** -0.021** -0.010* 0.359*** 0.373*** 
 (-60.95) (-346.12) (-2.20) (-1.99) (124.90) (259.73) 
ΔNExport -0.652*** -3.250*** 0.027**    
 (-25.94) (-114.75) (2.61)    
ΔTTS -0.153*** -0.508*** -0.010*** -0.181*** 0.080*** 0.065*** 
 (-13.78) (-133.86) (-134.61) (-16.67) (42.17) (90.73) 
ΔGDPG 0.333*** 0.312*** -0.015 -0.375*** -0.128*** -0.169*** 
 (5.10) (4.75) (-0.44) (-35.19) (-10.96) (-9.58) 
ΔGDPPC 0.003*** 0.013*** 0.000*** 0.003*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (19.11) (399.59) (23.96) (20.01) (-85.75) (-62.72) 
Imfassis 7.630*** 46.909*** -0.425 -5.000*** -1.512*** -1.645*** 
 (10.60) (533.79) (-0.58) (-7.92) (-94.44) (-21.50) 
Observations 357 357 110 110 357 357 
R-squared 0.239 0.239 0.345 0.345 0.130 0.130 
 
Notes: Table 14 presents the effect of changes in regulation, deregulation on changes in bank risk between 2007 
and 2008. Total regulation score (TotalR) is self-constructed based on World Bank surveys. Changes in the total 
regulation score (ΔTotalR) are calculated for each sample country using TotalR in 2008 minus TotalR in 2007. 
Deregulation is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a country experiences a negative change in regulation score 
from 2007 to 2008. Changes for other time-variant variables are also controlled in regressions. The z-statistics are 
reported in parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table A.1 
Banking Credit Rating Indicators. 
 
S&PLT (Standard & Poor's Issuer 
Credit Rating Long- term) 
MLTD (Moody Long-
term Rating) 
FLT (Fitch Long-Term 
Issuer Default Rating) 
Risk Score 
AAA Aaa AAA 1 
AA+ Aa1 AA+ 2 
AA Aa2 AA 3 
AA- Aa3 AA- 4 
A+ A1 A+ 5 
A A2 A 6 
A- A3 A- 7 
BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ 8 
BBB Baa2 BBB 9 
BBB- Baa3 BBB- 10 
BB+ Ba1 BB+ 11 
BB Ba2 BB 12 
BB- Ba3 BB- 13 
B+ B1 B+ 14 
B B2 B 15 
B- B3 B- 16 
CCC+ Caa1  
CCC  
17 
CCC Caa2 18 
CCC- Caa3 19 
CC Ca CC 20 
C C C 21 
SD  SD 22 
D  D 23 
 
Notes:  
1. Table A.1 shows the conversion of credit ratings in to numerical credit rating scores. 
2. Data source: BankScope. 
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Table A.2 
Definition and Data Sources of Main Variables. 
 
Variable Definition Calculation 
TotalR Total Regulation Self-constructed regulation score based on World Bank Survey (2008, 2012) 
Credit Rating Credit Rating Self-constructed credit rating score based on S&PLT, MLTD, and FLT 
Inverted Z Score  Insolvency Risk σROA/(ROA+EAR) 
Government Bank controlled by government Dummy variable that equals to 1 if the sample bank is controlled by the government, 0 otherwise. 
Industrial 
Bank controlled by industrial 
company  
Dummy variable that equals to 1 if the sample bank is controlled by an industrial company, 0 otherwise. 
Financial 
Bank controlled by financial 
company 
Dummy variable that equals to 1 if the sample bank is controlled by a financial company, 0 otherwise. 
Family Bank controlled by family Dummy variable that equals to 1 if the sample bank is controlled by a family, 0 otherwise. 
Foreign Bank controlled by foreign company Dummy variable that equals to 1 if the sample bank is controlled by a foreign company, 0 otherwise. 
Shareholding 
Shareholding by the controlling 
owner 
The percentage of shareholdings by the controlling owner of the bank 
Lnta Bank Size The natural logarithm of bank’s total asset 
Inflation Inflation Change in the national consumer price index 
RIR Real Interest Rate The deposit interest rate minus Inflation scaled by GDP 
IRD Interest Rate Differential Difference between the rate interest rate in a country and the average real interest of Germany, United States and 
Japan. 
Crisis Currency or Debt Crises Dummy variable if in a country-year there is a currency crisis, otherwise 0 
M2R M2 to Foreign Exchange Reserves The sum of currency outside banks, demand deposits other than those of the central government, and the time, 
savings, and foreign currency deposits of resident sectors other than the central government. 
Concentration Concentration Herfindahl-Hirschmann index of bank assets within a country 
SMC StockMarket Capitalization to GDP Value of listed shares to GDP 
FB Foreign Banks to Total Banks Percentage of the number of foreign banks to the number of the total banks in an Economy 
NExport Net Export Value of export minus import scaled by GDP 
TTS Term of Trade Shocks Standard deviation of the value of import divided by the value of export in constant prices of 2000 U.S. dollars 
GDPG GDP Growth Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita at market prices based on constant prices of 2000 U.S. dollars 
GDPPC GDP per capita GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population  
IMFassis IMF Assistant Program  Dummy variable if in a country-year there is an IMF program is running, otherwise 0. 
Notes:  
1. Bank size is collected from BankScope,  
2. IMF assistant program is collected from IMF, 
3. All other variables are collected from the World Bank Databank.
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Table A. 3 
Yearly Regulation Scores for All Sample Countries. 
 
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Argentina 79.240 79.240 79.240 79.240 72.494 72.501 72.486 72.494 72.494 
Armenia 73.613 73.613 73.613 73.613 74.069 74.066 74.002 74.046 74.046 
Bahrain 72.098 72.098 72.098 72.098 81.498 81.498 81.378 81.458 81.458 
Belarus 63.264 63.264 63.264 63.264 69.851 69.826 69.831 69.836 69.836 
Botswana 71.909 71.909 71.909 71.909 71.450 71.480 71.500 71.477 71.477 
Brazil 65.909 65.909 65.909 65.909 90.002 90.013 89.997 90.004 90.004 
Bulgaria 69.925 69.925 69.925 69.925 72.032 72.059 72.069 72.053 72.053 
Chile 68.791 68.791 68.791 68.791 78.219 78.231 78.223 78.224 78.224 
China  65.718 65.718 65.718 65.718 56.080 56.080 56.080 56.080 56.080 
Columbia 79.477 79.477 79.477 79.477 83.140 83.143 83.103 83.129 83.129 
Croatia 65.238 65.238 65.238 65.238 73.983 73.987 74.001 73.990 73.990 
Egypt 76.336 76.336 76.336 76.336 78.216 78.220 78.000 78.145 78.145 
Guatemala 76.528 76.528 76.528 76.528 70.498 70.504 70.503 70.501 70.501 
Guyana 69.730 69.730 69.730 69.730 69.612 69.640 69.650 69.634 69.634 
Honduras 74.558 74.558 74.558 74.558 71.055 71.068 71.080 71.068 71.068 
Hungary 79.654 79.654 79.654 79.654 72.428 72.449 72.454 72.444 72.444 
India 74.083 74.083 74.083 74.083 81.877 81.973 81.978 81.943 81.943 
Jordan 70.742 70.742 70.742 70.742 80.593 80.599 80.291 80.494 80.494 
Kazakhstan 66.806 66.806 66.806 66.806 39.791 39.551 39.783 39.708 39.708 
Kenya 81.054 81.054 81.054 81.054 76.860 76.870 76.880 76.870 76.870 
Kuwait 68.695 68.695 68.695 68.695 71.860 71.870 71.890 71.873 71.873 
Lebanon 77.023 77.023 77.023 77.023 65.693 65.694 65.500 65.629 65.629 
Luxembourg 65.480 65.480 65.480 65.480 78.201 78.233 78.235 78.223 78.223 
Malaysia 80.387 80.387 80.387 80.387 71.689 71.714 71.713 71.705 71.705 
Mali 59.580 59.580 59.580 59.580 72.458 72.458 72.458 72.458 72.458 
Mexico 59.159 59.159 59.159 59.159 78.713 78.726 78.723 78.721 78.721 
Nicaragua 80.580 80.580 80.580 80.580 89.215 89.235 89.235 89.228 89.228 
Niger 59.580 59.580 59.580 59.580 72.458 72.458 72.458 72.458 72.458 
Nigeria 75.246 75.246 75.246 75.246 73.515 73.349 73.412 73.425 73.425 
Oman 67.070 67.070 67.070 67.070 79.409 79.411 79.300 79.373 79.373 
Pakistan 78.776 78.776 78.776 78.776 74.352 74.376 74.378 74.369 74.369 
Panama 65.665 65.665 65.665 65.665 63.579 63.585 63.584 63.583 63.583 
Peru 75.539 75.539 75.539 75.539 77.847 77.956 77.962 77.922 77.922 
Philippines 76.375 76.375 76.375 76.375 83.309 83.309 83.322 83.313 83.313 
Poland 65.941 65.941 65.941 65.941 79.440 79.458 79.462 79.453 79.453 
Romania 68.646 68.646 68.646 68.646 74.239 74.255 74.263 74.252 74.252 
Russia 66.643 66.643 66.643 66.643 67.221 67.252 67.237 67.237 67.237 
Senegal 59.580 59.580 59.580 59.580 71.458 71.458 71.458 71.458 71.458 
South Africa 67.445 67.445 67.445 67.445 71.670 71.677 71.686 71.678 71.678 
Thailand 78.715 78.715 78.715 78.715 79.809 79.820 79.820 79.816 79.816 
Togo 59.580 59.580 59.580 59.580 72.458 72.458 72.458 72.458 72.458 
Uruguay 70.102 70.102 70.102 70.102 89.207 89.221 89.205 89.211 89.211 
Venezuela 55.753 55.753 55.753 55.753 75.620 75.620 75.620 75.620 75.620 
 
Notes: Table A.3 shows the self-constructed national bank regulation scores for the 43 sample countries during 
the sample period of 2004-2012. The regulation scores increase over time in most sample countries but decrease 
in 14 out of 43 sample countries. 
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Table A.4a 
Subcategory Regulations on Bank Total Risk based the CAMELS Indicators. 
 
VARIABLES     Total Risk     
Constant -1.592*** 2.329*** 0.566** 1.585*** 0.780** -0.704** -0.378 1.210*** -1.305*** -1.492*** -0.282 -0.467 
 (-3.43) (6.87) (2.07) (5.27) (2.11) (-2.39) (-1.20) (4.41) (-2.69) (-3.03) (-1.03) (-0.99) 
Lagged DV 0.457*** 0.457*** 0.456*** 0.449*** 0.457*** 0.453*** 0.448*** 0.460*** 0.440*** 0.444*** 0.460*** 0.446*** 
 (94.63) (116.63) (121.91) (133.52) (133.73) (125.82) (112.86) (131.44) (88.55) (93.42) (137.21) (94.30) 
EntryR 0.104***            
 (6.32)            
OwnershipR  -0.213***           
  (-18.16)           
CapitalR   -0.088***          
   (-7.89)          
ActivitiesR    -0.163***         
    (-15.10)         
ExAuditR     -0.162***        
     (-7.45)        
ManagementR      0.852***       
      (16.80)       
LiquidityR       -0.217***      
       (-10.12)      
DepositR        -0.082***     
        (-6.38)     
ProvisionR         0.226***    
         (28.84)    
DisclosureR          0.043   
          (1.08)   
ExitR           0.037***  
           (2.74)  
SupervisionR            -0.034*** 
            (-2.81) 
Government -3.633*** -2.940*** -2.336*** -0.676* -3.155*** -2.220*** -2.726*** -3.024*** -1.067** -1.012** -2.408*** -1.024** 
 (-9.26) (-7.33) (-6.19) (-1.70) (-8.89) (-6.67) (-7.79) (-8.77) (-2.10) (-2.55) (-5.91) (-2.36) 
Industrial -3.947*** -4.799*** -4.796*** -2.864*** -5.407*** -3.453*** -1.510*** -4.388*** -1.305*** -1.225*** -4.329*** -1.020*** 
 (-11.15) (-14.17) (-15.77) (-8.42) (-17.53) (-11.94) (-5.36) (-13.66) (-3.49) (-3.80) (-13.49) (-3.12) 
Financial 2.665*** 2.789*** 2.083*** 3.672*** 1.703*** 2.549*** 1.659*** 1.743*** 4.303*** 3.260*** 2.451*** 3.337*** 
 (5.80) (7.44) (5.35) (10.15) (4.20) (8.69) (5.93) (4.24) (10.05) (8.95) (6.46) (7.53) 
Family -5.965*** -5.696*** -2.591*** -2.264*** -4.323*** -3.723*** -4.986*** -4.581*** -5.032*** -3.192*** -4.334*** -6.186*** 
 (-4.99) (-6.14) (-3.46) (-2.79) (-4.58) (-4.41) (-5.88) (-4.75) (-3.77) (-2.63) (-4.55) (-5.85) 
Foreign -3.247*** -3.015*** -2.549*** -2.329*** -2.621*** -2.875*** -1.008*** -2.766*** -2.537*** -1.763*** -2.703*** -1.414*** 
 (-7.98) (-10.33) (-8.88) (-9.62) (-8.34) (-12.38) (-4.51) (-9.45) (-7.68) (-4.96) (-10.12) (-3.54) 
Shareholding 0.011*** 0.004 0.003 -0.015*** 0.006** 0.002 0.004* 0.007** -0.013*** -0.009** 0.002 -0.010** 
 (3.28) (1.21) (1.00) (-4.92) (2.08) (0.70) (1.75) (2.34) (-3.28) (-2.43) (0.68) (-2.53) 
Lnta 0.090*** -0.042* -0.026 -0.038** 0.033 0.002 -0.031* -0.026 -2.938*** -2.879*** -0.017 -2.863*** 
 (4.24) (-1.91) (-1.42) (-2.07) (1.47) (0.09) (-1.69) (-1.27) (-33.96) (-32.45) (-0.78) (-34.53) 
Inflation 0.078*** 0.060*** 0.056*** 0.062*** 0.063*** 0.054*** 0.081*** 0.060*** 0.049*** 0.069*** 0.055*** 0.069*** 
 (17.50) (19.58) (20.04) (18.47) (16.95) (17.32) (22.92) (15.27) (8.60) (11.73) (15.42) (13.18) 
RIR 0.060*** 0.037*** 0.042*** 0.032*** 0.049*** 0.044*** 0.058*** 0.044*** 0.030*** 0.042*** 0.046*** 0.043*** 
 (12.78) (10.76) (12.07) (6.77) (13.22) (12.55) (14.27) (10.06) (6.00) (9.61) (11.25) (7.32) 
IRD -0.102*** -0.121*** -0.123*** -0.108*** -0.125*** -0.135*** -0.134*** -0.131*** -0.137*** -0.081*** -0.134*** -0.100*** 
 (-9.29) (-18.57) (-20.75) (-13.65) (-17.69) (-16.02) (-17.72) (-14.50) (-15.29) (-9.06) (-16.02) (-9.97) 
Crisis 0.761*** 1.074*** 1.056*** 1.106*** 1.083*** 1.029*** 0.927*** 1.173*** 1.056*** 0.596*** 1.067*** 0.674*** 
 (4.60) (10.74) (11.34) (11.68) (10.03) (11.07) (10.60) (11.83) (8.08) (3.73) (11.35) (4.83) 
M2R 0.084*** 0.069*** 0.073*** 0.056*** 0.105*** 0.065*** 0.169*** 0.059*** 0.079*** 0.109*** 0.077*** 0.102*** 
 (4.37) (3.76) (4.27) (3.09) (6.68) (3.71) (10.08) (2.86) (3.18) (4.78) (4.00) (4.15) 
Concentration 0.023*** 0.007*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.016*** 0.006*** 0.010*** 0.016*** 0.010*** 0.015*** 
 (11.09) (4.93) (9.21) (9.08) (5.57) (7.20) (12.10) (3.58) (5.83) (8.53) (8.50) (7.81) 
SMC -0.007*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.004*** -0.007*** 
 (-5.29) (-4.75) (-5.17) (-5.93) (-5.26) (-6.98) (-10.11) (-6.75) (-8.97) (-8.44) (-5.01) (-8.15) 
FB -0.010** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.012*** 0.015*** 0.011*** 
 (-2.48) (6.75) (8.56) (8.99) (10.51) (8.73) (9.52) (10.70) (7.23) (4.83) (8.61) (4.36) 
NExport -0.008 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.009*** 0.015*** 0.010*** -0.003 0.013*** 0.001 -0.006* 0.014*** -0.005 
 (-1.19) (4.38) (5.69) (4.41) (5.69) (4.98) (-1.43) (4.77) (0.26) (-1.70) (6.84) (-1.31) 
TTS 0.002 -0.003*** -0.002** -0.000 -0.001* -0.001 0.001 -0.002*** 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002** 
 (1.53) (-4.08) (-2.45) (-0.25) (-1.90) (-0.76) (0.90) (-3.55) (0.00) (0.74) (1.10) (2.00) 
GDPG 0.056*** 0.059*** 0.053*** 0.066*** 0.071*** 0.055*** 0.080*** 0.064*** 0.049*** 0.060*** 0.054*** 0.063*** 
 (8.55) (11.67) (11.03) (13.60) (12.15) (12.17) (17.91) (10.56) (6.66) (7.78) (10.84) (10.03) 
GDPPC 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 
 (0.06) (-14.74) (-19.28) (-20.76) (-20.99) (-20.19) (-14.41) (-19.12) (0.96) (1.64) (-18.76) (0.67) 
IMFassis -0.230*** -0.031 -0.207*** -0.116*** -0.261*** -0.231*** -0.233*** -0.175*** -0.097** -0.197*** -0.193*** -0.068 
 (-4.18) (-0.81) (-7.11) (-3.39) (-7.94) (-6.74) (-7.28) (-3.83) (-2.21) (-4.09) (-5.31) (-1.36) 
Observations 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,499 
Number of id 357 357 357 357 357 357 357 357 357 357 357 357 
AB test AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AB test AR(2) 0.450 0.416 0.422 0.440 0.405 0.441 0.395 0.423 0.442 0.432 0.432 0.420 
Sargan test 0.947 0.989 0.820 0.990 0.990 0.991 0.874 0.989 0.648 0.591 0.989 0.615 
 
Note: Table A.4a presents the effects of the twelve subcategory regulations on bank risk measured as total risk 
constructed based on CAMELS indicators.  
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Table A.4b 
Subcategory Regulations on Bank Credit Risk (Credit Rating Score). 
 
VARIABLES     Credit Rating Risk     
Constant 0.427 0.201 2.122*** 0.508 1.734*** 0.232 1.367*** 0.789** 0.142 0.749* -0.359 1.305** 
 (1.42) (0.49) (5.81) (1.39) (6.45) (0.65) (5.31) (2.34) (0.44) (1.94) (-0.85) (2.11) 
Lagged DV 0.975*** 0.980*** 0.950*** 0.986*** 0.959*** 1.000*** 0.967*** 0.969*** 0.988*** 0.997*** 0.992*** 0.984*** 
 (98.31) (91.69) (106.48) (81.14) (72.48) (80.90) (89.87) (80.97) (88.87) (98.38) (84.55) (72.05) 
EntryR 0.022**            
 (2.02)            
OwnershipR  0.041***           
  (2.81)           
CapitalR   -0.025**          
   (-2.08)          
ActivitiesR    -0.024***         
    (-2.62)         
ExAuditR     -0.038**        
     (-2.23)        
ManagementR      -0.239***       
      (-4.46)       
LiquidityR       -0.002      
       (-0.12)      
DepositR        -0.017*     
        (-1.86)     
ProvisionR         -0.023**    
         (-2.00)    
DisclosureR          -0.062***   
          (-3.48)   
ExitR           0.053***  
           (3.38)  
SupervisionR            -0.030*** 
            (-2.86) 
Government 0.059 -0.029 0.266 -0.026 -0.330 -0.544** -0.033 -0.054 -0.186 -0.116 -0.491* -0.646* 
 (0.27) (-0.11) (1.12) (-0.10) (-1.10) (-2.12) (-0.13) (-0.19) (-0.84) (-0.42) (-1.93) (-1.72) 
Industrial -0.110 -0.133 0.646 -0.466 0.089 -0.360 -0.115 0.088 -0.278 0.101 -0.173 -0.460 
 (-0.36) (-0.50) (1.35) (-1.52) (0.20) (-1.48) (-0.34) (0.31) (-1.03) (0.45) (-0.72) (-1.29) 
Financial -0.179 0.095 0.262 -0.132 0.385 -0.191 0.281 0.614** 0.112 0.179 -0.001 -0.107 
 (-0.78) (0.42) (1.37) (-0.58) (1.19) (-0.86) (1.31) (2.47) (0.50) (0.82) (-0.00) (-0.30) 
Family 1.557*** 1.749*** 0.499* 2.510*** -0.057 0.980*** -0.258 1.425*** 1.270*** 0.682*** 1.348*** -0.486* 
 (6.00) (9.23) (1.68) (6.87) (-0.18) (4.04) (-1.07) (5.88) (5.30) (2.93) (4.90) (-1.79) 
Foreign 0.138 -0.364*** 0.282 -0.203 -0.756** -0.422*** -0.300* -0.323*** -0.249** -0.336** -0.357** -0.231 
 (0.65) (-2.87) (1.28) (-0.96) (-2.56) (-2.69) (-1.65) (-2.66) (-1.96) (-2.50) (-2.19) (-0.60) 
Shareholding -0.004 -0.004 -0.007*** -0.004 -0.002 0.002 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 0.000 0.002 
 (-1.38) (-1.19) (-2.73) (-1.14) (-0.47) (0.77) (-1.49) (-1.54) (-0.82) (-1.19) (0.16) (0.71) 
Lnta -0.164*** -0.155*** -0.052 -0.083 -0.059 -0.226*** -0.145*** -0.139*** -0.117** -0.196*** -0.080 -0.124** 
 (-2.95) (-3.06) (-1.21) (-1.43) (-1.30) (-6.15) (-2.82) (-2.97) (-2.49) (-4.29) (-1.54) (-2.38) 
Inflation 0.006** 0.005** 0.002 0.003 0.010*** 0.001 0.002 0.007*** 0.005** 0.003 0.006** 0.008** 
 (2.11) (2.30) (0.56) (1.00) (2.99) (0.35) (0.81) (3.06) (1.96) (1.26) (2.32) (2.20) 
RIR 0.015*** 0.011*** 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.003 0.010** 0.005 0.006 0.005* 0.006** 0.018*** 
 (2.98) (2.76) (4.47) (3.76) (4.73) (0.78) (2.37) (1.38) (1.64) (1.79) (1.99) (5.11) 
IRD -0.028*** -0.032*** -0.038*** -0.021*** -0.033*** -0.022*** -0.043*** -0.021*** -0.017** -0.036*** -0.023*** -0.036*** 
 (-4.27) (-5.05) (-4.43) (-2.94) (-3.99) (-3.09) (-6.40) (-3.62) (-2.09) (-5.17) (-2.77) (-4.64) 
Crisis 0.459*** 0.247*** 0.172* 0.315*** 0.079 0.223*** 0.333*** 0.137** 0.100 0.245*** 0.090 0.243*** 
 (4.00) (4.29) (1.90) (4.07) (0.80) (4.38) (5.06) (2.33) (1.37) (5.83) (1.39) (4.46) 
M2R 0.061*** 0.067*** 0.009 0.058*** -0.004 0.054*** -0.013 0.028 0.043** 0.038*** 0.077*** -0.028 
 (3.41) (4.13) (0.35) (5.03) (-0.16) (4.43) (-0.48) (1.56) (2.26) (2.78) (5.93) (-0.89) 
Concentration 0.003*** 0.002** -0.001* -0.000 -0.002* 0.004*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** -0.001 
 (2.90) (2.42) (-1.66) (-0.11) (-1.90) (4.81) (0.10) (2.66) (3.74) (3.12) (3.06) (-1.08) 
SMC -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001 -0.002*** -0.001 -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002*** 0.001 
 (-2.86) (-5.42) (-2.85) (-3.56) (-1.11) (-4.06) (-1.41) (-7.49) (-4.24) (-3.52) (-5.09) (0.96) 
FB 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.003 0.009*** 0.003 0.003** 0.006* 0.002* 0.003* 0.002 0.003* 0.004 
 (3.46) (4.85) (0.81) (6.82) (0.79) (1.96) (1.82) (1.68) (1.94) (1.07) (1.88) (1.30) 
NExport 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.000 0.005* 0.001 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.003 0.005* 0.007*** 
 (3.82) (4.64) (3.00) (2.92) (0.11) (1.91) (0.49) (2.93) (2.91) (1.21) (1.86) (2.60) 
TTS -0.000 -0.000 -0.003*** 0.001* -0.002*** -0.001 -0.003*** -0.001* -0.001 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.003*** 
 (-0.26) (-1.03) (-6.71) (1.80) (-3.91) (-1.33) (-4.73) (-1.72) (-1.23) (-3.66) (-0.27) (-5.73) 
GDPG -0.007** -0.008** -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 -0.003 -0.005 -0.012*** -0.005 0.000 
 (-2.21) (-2.16) (-0.76) (-1.28) (-0.53) (-1.15) (-0.54) (-0.78) (-0.97) (-3.69) (-1.27) (0.06) 
GDPPC -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 
 (-8.03) (-5.41) (-1.34) (-7.02) (0.67) (-4.29) (-0.09) (-4.84) (-4.60) (-2.67) (-4.03) (-0.82) 
IMFassis -0.078** 0.007 -0.008 -0.016 0.033 -0.036 -0.051 -0.065* -0.010 -0.021 0.014 -0.015 
 (-1.96) (0.26) (-0.24) (-0.42) (0.97) (-1.20) (-1.41) (-1.95) (-0.29) (-0.72) (0.55) (-0.45) 
Observations 878 878 878 878 878 878 878 878 878 878 878 878 
Number of id 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 
AB test AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AB test AR(2) 0.693 0.662 0.599 0.675 0.594 0.707 0.606 0.680 0.704 0.704 0.575 0.812 
Sargan test 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
Note: Table A.4b presents the effects of the twelve subcategory regulations on bank risk measured as credit 
rating score.  
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Table A. 4c 
Subcategory Regulations on Bank Insolvency Risk (Inverted z score). 
 
VARIABLES Insolvency Risk (inverted z score) 
Constant -0.665*** -0.288*** -0.474*** -0.928*** 0.120*** -0.486*** -0.700*** -0.283*** -0.269*** -0.401*** -0.400*** -0.491*** 
 (-80.77) (-49.00) (-96.08) (-105.98) (11.76) (-100.54) (-82.61) (-30.55) (-53.47) (-75.93) (-98.95) (-106.83) 
Lagged DV 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.092*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.092*** 0.095*** 0.092*** 0.090*** 0.092*** 0.090*** 0.090*** 
 (1,134.73) (1,717.40) (2,016.45) (827.99) (1,247.99) (2,102.79) (1,122.22) (1,741.73) (2,205.13) (2,043.46) (2,115.58) (2,242.00) 
EntryR -0.007***            
 (-63.01)            
OwnershipR  -0.022***           
  (-196.58)           
CapitalR   -0.006***          
   (-60.00)          
ActivitiesR    -0.001***         
    (-10.96)         
ExAuditR     -0.064***        
     (-266.95)        
ManagementR      -0.029***       
      (-42.29)       
LiquidityR       0.034***      
       (141.70)      
DepositR        -0.005***     
        (-28.99)     
ProvisionR         0.004***    
         (90.75)    
DisclosureR          -0.013***   
          (-76.33)   
ExitR           0.001***  
           (15.34)  
SupervisionR            0.008*** 
            (115.11) 
Government -0.853*** -0.749*** -0.588*** -0.880*** -0.994*** -0.638*** -0.820*** -1.028*** -0.804*** -0.585*** -0.774*** -0.627*** 
 (-50.09) (-66.34) (-73.32) (-46.68) (-50.34) (-58.90) (-24.74) (-51.50) (-59.82) (-62.40) (-75.77) (-65.81) 
Industrial -0.649*** -0.643*** -0.618*** -0.528*** -0.966*** -0.595*** -0.537*** -0.670*** -0.701*** -0.584*** -0.760*** -0.642*** 
 (-58.46) (-92.64) (-116.33) (-47.18) (-64.12) (-92.65) (-34.69) (-54.55) (-85.25) (-99.65) (-107.45) (-107.86) 
Financial -0.439*** -0.427*** -0.429*** -0.281*** -0.536*** -0.415*** -0.309*** -0.564*** -0.421*** -0.393*** -0.447*** -0.326*** 
 (-34.42) (-60.63) (-63.50) (-18.50) (-39.48) (-61.85) (-15.36) (-56.74) (-56.13) (-52.42) (-56.36) (-45.85) 
Family -0.773*** -0.240*** 0.039* -1.161*** -0.734*** -0.041 -0.987*** -0.036 -0.623*** -0.124*** -0.583*** -0.382*** 
 (-18.95) (-8.80) (1.69) (-26.27) (-14.95) (-1.47) (-13.50) (-0.74) (-20.44) (-5.04) (-25.25) (-17.05) 
Foreign -0.192*** -0.220*** -0.045*** -0.466*** -0.434*** -0.149*** -0.549*** -0.489*** -0.373*** -0.152*** -0.356*** -0.326*** 
 (-24.03) (-42.44) (-9.44) (-61.68) (-38.77) (-26.55) (-48.75) (-49.83) (-59.12) (-31.15) (-65.44) (-77.35) 
Shareholding 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 
 (13.51) (21.80) (13.81) (11.08) (17.27) (12.31) (8.40) (24.38) (19.51) (14.20) (27.11) (18.00) 
Lnta 0.035*** 0.054*** 0.051*** 0.041*** 0.059*** 0.055*** 0.054*** 0.044*** 0.050*** 0.053*** 0.051*** 0.057*** 
 (49.53) (131.79) (169.17) (59.15) (72.30) (179.83) (80.08) (57.30) (174.56) (162.23) (165.33) (198.71) 
Inflation 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.000* 0.003*** 0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (37.53) (72.35) (84.81) (69.31) (1.86) (87.53) (51.09) (-29.55) (-28.80) (71.62) (-31.87) (-48.60) 
RIR -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.004*** 0.001*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (-173.07) (-256.61) (-239.33) (-171.99) (-85.57) (-213.12) (37.76) (-158.13) (-162.32) (-187.55) (-158.25) (-165.35) 
IRD 0.032*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.032*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.021*** 0.026*** 0.018*** 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 
 (523.08) (344.42) (344.33) (374.06) (277.26) (346.39) (242.73) (392.97) (329.70) (328.68) (428.93) (444.29) 
Crisis 0.054*** 0.039*** 0.002*** 0.058*** 0.063*** 0.040*** 0.008*** 0.087*** 0.064*** 0.048*** 0.044*** 0.035*** 
 (89.15) (55.51) (3.31) (61.26) (82.07) (43.11) (9.63) (119.47) (115.36) (55.37) (115.96) (66.43) 
M2R -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.008*** -0.016*** 0.009*** -0.015*** -0.010*** -0.018*** -0.010*** -0.013*** 
 (-85.27) (-109.39) (-141.42) (-71.69) (-52.58) (-126.64) (50.13) (-77.56) (-90.52) (-190.84) (-109.81) (-103.43) 
Concentration -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.003*** -0.006*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.006*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (-348.56) (-283.08) (-336.56) (-244.67) (-214.80) (-280.54) (-136.70) (-267.07) (-444.90) (-278.92) (-295.04) (-309.38) 
SMC 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (27.77) (58.52) (62.63) (21.03) (103.11) (63.06) (88.11) (37.29) (120.08) (78.62) (97.76) (75.99) 
FB 0.002*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (82.55) (158.81) (192.94) (52.72) (130.11) (176.52) (134.36) (71.58) (181.85) (180.02) (136.42) (104.80) 
NExport 0.000 -0.000* -0.000*** -0.002*** -0.000*** -0.000 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** 
 (0.61) (-1.74) (-26.24) (-43.27) (-5.31) (-0.69) (32.29) (-39.81) (7.08) (11.01) (-1.21) (-30.35) 
TTS 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (93.37) (62.75) (111.67) (111.42) (95.34) (104.33) (198.32) (46.03) (276.73) (103.88) (145.29) (250.01) 
GDPG -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.005*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.009*** 
 (-192.45) (-221.81) (-298.71) (-184.56) (-182.90) (-223.30) (-158.52) (-229.15) (-300.30) (-258.37) (-317.10) (-267.91) 
GDPPC -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-60.92) (-65.01) (-69.08) (-54.24) (-69.75) (-74.63) (-84.03) (-67.40) (-153.80) (-79.81) (-172.63) (-114.84) 
IMFassis 0.019*** 0.029*** 0.019*** 0.016*** -0.009*** 0.018*** -0.032*** -0.006*** -0.002*** 0.012*** -0.010*** -0.021*** 
 (76.47) (127.71) (83.52) (57.93) (-38.11) (66.48) (-122.83) (-25.22) (-14.42) (65.25) (-66.62) (-162.68) 
Observations 2,856 2,856 2,856 2,856 2,856 2,856 2,856 2,856 2,856 2,856 2,856 2,856 
Number of id 357 357 357 357 357 357 357 357 357 357 357 357 
AB test AR(1) 0.083 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.086 0.084 0.086 0.085 0.086 0.084 0.085 0.085 
AB test AR(2) 0.424 0.427 0.427 0.420 0.431 0.424 0.438 0.426 0.423 0.422 0.430 0.429 
Sargan test 0.086 0.461 0.575 0.017 0.098 0.542 0.259 0.099 0.725 0.532 0.727 0.734 
 
 
Note: Table A.4c presents the effects of the twelve subcategory regulations on bank risk measured as inverted z 
score, respectively.  
 
